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The New Frontier of Constitutional Confession
Law-The International Arena: Exploring the
Admissibility of Confessions Taken by U.S.
Investigators From Non-Americans Abroad
MARK

A.

GODSEY*
INTRODUCTION

In recent years, American crime, like the American economy, has become
markedly more global in nature.' Advances in technology have made former
obstacles such as national borders and continental distances less daunting to
foreign criminals who target the United States and its citizens with criminal
schemes ranging from Internet fraud to drug trafficking to horrific acts of
terrorism. 2 As a result of this trend, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
and other federal law enforcement agencies are dispatching their agents with
increasing frequency beyond the borders of the United States to investigate
4
3
violations of American criminal laws committed by non-American citizens.

* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law; Faculty Director, Center for
Law and Justice and Ohio Innocence Project. Former Assistant United States Attorney, Southern
District of New York, 1996-2001. E-mail: mark.godsey@uc.edu. I would like to thank Professors
Gabriel (Jack) Chin, Emily Houh, Mark Stavsky and John Valauri for reviewing earlier drafts of this
Article and providing helpful suggestions. Finally, I would like to thank Raeshon Monsoor, a recent
graduate of the Salmon P. Chase College of Law, for his outstanding research assistance.
1. See Diane Marie Amann, The Rights of the Accused in a Global Enforcement Arena, 6 ILSA INT'L
& COMP. L. 555, 555 (2000):
It is a commonplace that crime, no less than other industries, has become a global venture.
Criminal networks routinely cross borders to produce or distribute commodities that range
from drugs to endangered species, and to purge the ill-gotten profits of their taint. Indeed,
crimes occur in borderless space. Money is laundered, bets are made, pornography is viewed
over the Internet.
Roberto Iraola, A Primeron Legal Issues Surrounding the ExtraterritorialApprehension of Criminals,
29 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 2 (2001) (discussing globalization of crime); see generally Howard M. Shapiro,
The FBI in the 21st Century, 28 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 219 (1995) (in an address at the Cornell Law
School, the General Counsel of the FBI discussed the globalization of crime and the FBI's efforts to
meet that challenge).
2. See Ethan A. Nadelmann, The Role of the United States in the International Enforcement of
Criminal Law, 31 HARV. INT'L L.J. 37, 38 (1990) (discussing the globalization of crime and stating:
"[T]oday, terrorism, arms and high tech smuggling, and securities, tax and commercial fraud all
contribute to this trend. In general, as the scope and volume of international interactions ranging from
trade to tourism increase, so too do the criminal activities that inevitably accompany them."). See
generally Amann, supra note 1;Shapiro, supra note 1.
3. For purposes of this Article, the term "non-American" refers to an individual who is not a citizen
of the United States.
4. See Diane Marie Amann, A Whipsaw Cuts Both Ways: The PrivilegeAgainst Self-Incrimination in
an International Context, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1201, 1261-63 (1998) (describing the recent increase in
U.S. law enforcement activities overseas); V. Rock Grundman, The New Imperialism: The Extraterritorial Application of United States Law, 14 IN'L L. 257, 257 (1980) (suggesting that in the previous
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Indeed, the FBI planned to double the number of agents it stationed abroad
between 1996 and 2000 alone.5 In light of the terrorist attacks in New York and
Washington, D.C. on September 11, 2001, and with the persistent ebb of
technological advances that continue to shrink the globe for enterprising foreign
criminals, this heightened international presence will undoubtedly become a
fixture of U.S. law enforcement in the years to come.6
A question of constitutional significance that will have to be resolved in this
context is to what extent the various provisions of the Bill of Rights apply to
non-Americans, if at all, when they are interrogated by American law enforcement officials abroad. Within the territorial boundaries of the United States,
several different constitutional doctrines control the admissibility of pretrial
confessions taken by law enforcement officials. These include the Miranda
doctrine,7 the due process "involuntary confession rule" of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments," the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against compulsory

twenty-five years the United States' three major exports had been "rock music, blue jeans and United
States law"); Tyler Raimo, Comment, Winning at the Expense of Law: The Ramifications of Expanding
Counter-TerrorismLaw Enforcement JurisdictionOverseas, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1473, 1495 n. 114
(1999) (citing National Public Radio broadcast's assertion that the FBI had expanded from a primarily
domestic law enforcement agency to an international law enforcement agency); Carrie Truehart,
Comment, United States v. Bin Laden and the Foreign Intelligence Exception to the Warrant Requirement for Searches of "United States Persons" Abroad, 82 B.U. L. REV. 555, 555-56 (2002) (documenting expansion of American investigations into criminal activity abroad); David Johnston, Strength Seen
in a U.S. Export: Law Enforcement, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1995, at Al (citing an informal State
Department study suggesting that eight U.S. law enforcement agencies employed 1649 people in
permanent overseas assignments in 1995).
5. RICHARD A. BEST, JR., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., INTELLIGENCE AND LAW ENFORCEMENT: COUNTERING
TRANSNATIONAL THREATS TO THE U.S. 12 (2001) (stating that the FBI launched a four-year plan in 1996
to double the number of agents serving in legal attach6 offices in American embassies by the year
2000); see also Counter-terrorismPolicy: Hearings Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 105th Cong.
123 (1998) (testimony of Louis J. Freeh, Director of the FBI, describing the recent expansion of the
FBI's activities overseas).
6. In 2002, the FBI operated forty-four offices around the world, and planned to continue expanding
its presence abroad. See Current and Projected NationalSecurity Threats to the United States: Hearing
Before the Senate Select Comm. on Intelligence, 107th Cong. 88 (2002) (statement of Dale L. Watson,
Executive Assistant Director, Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence, FBI) (discussing FBI's current
deployment around the world and plans to continue expansion of international presence).
For the sake of simplicity, the terms "FBI" and "FBI agents" are used in this Article to represent all
U.S. law enforcement agencies and their agents.
7. The intricacies of the Miranda doctrine will be developed in detail later in this Article. See infra
notes 57-85 and accompanying text. In short, "Miranda warnings" are recitations of a suspect's
constitutional rights, including the right to remain silent and the right to counsel, which must be
administered before a law enforcement officer can "interrogate" a suspect who is in police "custody."
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469 (1966) (describing the specific warnings required prior to
"in-custody interrogation").
8. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces,
or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person
be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty,
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self-incrimination 9 and the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel.'° The Supreme
Court has held that these protections apply during interrogations occurring
within the United States regardless of the alienage" of the suspect under
interrogation.' 2 The Supreme Court has also held that these constitutional
protections apply to American citizens who are interrogated by U.S. law
enforcement officials outside of the United States. 13 But do these protections
apply to non-Americans located outside of the United States at the time of the
interrogation? Can an Italian citizen who has been brought to the United States
for trial successfully claim, for example, that the confession he made to an FBI
or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use
without just compensation.
U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in
pertinent part: "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. Although the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause applies to
the states, and the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause applies to the federal government, the due
process involuntary confession rule derived from each is identical. This doctrine will be discussed in
detail infra notes 40-50 and accompanying text.
9. Although the details of the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination will be
explored later in this Article, it is based upon the following language in the text of the Fifth
Amendment: "No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
10. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in relevant part: "In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defense." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
11."Alienage" has been defined as: "the status of a person ...of another ... nation." MERRIAMWEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 28 (10th ed. 1993). As used in this Article, "alienage" refers to a
person's citizenship, or lack thereof, of the United States. "Alien" is used to refer to a person who is not
a citizen of the United States, as is the term "non-American."
12. As the Supreme Court has said:
The Bill of Rights is a futile authority for the alien seeking admission for the first time to these
shores. But once an alien lawfully enters and resides in this country he becomes invested with
the rights guaranteed by the Constitution to all people within our borders. Such rights include
those protected by the First and the Fifth Amendments and by the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. None of these provisions acknowledges any distinction between
citizens and resident aliens. They extend their inalienable privileges to all 'persons' and guard
against any encroachment on those rights by federal or state authority.
Hellenis Lines, Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306, 309 n.5 (1970) (quoting Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135,
161 (1945)). Although Hellenis Lines may perhaps not be as broad as the proposition for which it is
cited in this footnote, no one would dispute the fact that all individuals, regardless of citizenship or
alienage, are protected by the Bill of Rights during interrogations that occur within the United States.
See infra note 172.
13. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1957):
At the beginning we reject the idea that when the United States acts against citizens abroad it
can do so free of the Bill of Rights .... When the Government reaches out to punish a citizen
who is abroad, the shield which the Bill of Rights and other parts of the Constitution provide
to protect his life and liberty should not be stripped away just because he happens to be in
another land.
Although Reid may perhaps not be quite as broad as the proposition for which it is cited in this
footnote, this Article focuses solely on the applicability of constitutional confession law to nonAmericans abroad and is not concerned with the applicability of the Bill of Rights to American citizens
abroad.
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agent in Italy must be suppressed because the FBI agent failed to recite Miranda
warnings to him before the interrogation commenced? Can he claim that his
confession should be suppressed because the FBI agent coerced it from him in
violation of the due process involuntary confession rule? Can this defendant
accurately assert that he was cloaked with the protections of the privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination
or the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
4
during his interrogation in Italy?'
These questions have not yet been clearly answered by United States courts.
Without guidance from the Supreme Court, lower courts facing these issues thus
far have typically expressed confusion at the outset, followed by conclusory
judgments that fail to address the inherent difficulties presented by these
issues. 15 In many instances, these courts have done nothing more than make
admitted assumptions that these constitutional rights either do or do not apply,
without providing any explanation or citing any legal support whatsoever for
their assumptions.16 Yet in light of the ongoing globalization of crime, thoughtful and accurate answers to these questions are of increasing importance to all
American criminal investigations abroad.' 7 As a consequence, federal courts,
and ultimately the Supreme Court, will be forced to confront these questions
head-on in the not too distant future. In so doing, the courts will need to
carefully examine the origin, text, policies, and precedents of these constitutional provisions to accurately determine their applicability in the international
arena.
In a recent article, I addressed the first question that naturally arises in this
context: whether Miranda warnings are required at the outset of an FBI
interrogation of a non-American citizen abroad.' 8 In that article, I examined the
flexible, prophylactic nature of the Miranda doctrine,' 9 the policies underlying
that doctrine, and the difficulties inherent in requiring Miranda abroad (for
example, how can an FBI agent abroad advise a foreign suspect that he has a
right to an attorney during an interrogation when the law of the foreign country

14. As set forth infra at notes 33-88 and accompanying text, the primary constitutional doctrines
that concern the admissibility of confessions are the Mirandadoctrine, the privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination and the due process involuntary confession rule. Accordingly, the extraterritorial
application to non-Americans of the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel will not be addressed in this
Article.
15. See infra notes 207, 239 and accompanying text; see also United States v. Bin Laden, 132 F.
Supp. 2d 168, 194 n.26 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (acknowledging the possibility of more than one constitutional
confession doctrine as applied abroad to non-Americans).
16. See infra notes 207, 239 and accompanying text; see also Bin Laden, 132 F. Supp. 2d at
194 n.26.
17. See Bin Laden, 132 F. Supp. 2d at 185 (recognizing that applicability of U.S. confession law
abroad is of increasing importance as U.S. continues to increase its law enforcement presence
overseas).
18. Mark A. Godsey, Miranda's Final Frontier-The International Arena: A Critical Analysis of
United States v. Bin Laden, and a Proposalfor a New Miranda Exception Abroad, 51 DUKE L.J. 1703
(2002).
19. Id. at 1734-52.
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where the interrogation takes place prohibits the presence of defense attorneys
during pretrial interrogations?). 20 I then applied the balancing test that determines Miranda's applicability to new situations not addressed by the original
Miranda decision. 2' I concluded that courts should not require FBI agents to
strictly adhere to the dictates of Miranda abroad.2 2 Rigidly requiring Miranda
warnings in the international arena would unduly burden American law enforcement interests while simultaneously failing to advance the civil liberties that the
Miranda court intended to protect domestically when it originally carved its
now-famous warning/waiver procedure. 23
But the answer to the first question logically raises the more important
question that I address in this Article: If Miranda does not necessarily apply in
the international arena, what constitutional limitations on interrogations, if any,
do apply? Indeed, the Supreme Court has carved numerous exceptions to
Miranda's applicability within the United States.24 Where Miranda's warning/
waiver framework does not apply within the United States, two distinct constitutional doctrines exist as possible "default" rules. The first, the due process
involuntary confession rule, excludes from trial confessions that are made
"involuntarily" as a result of police coercion. 25 The second, the privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination, renders inadmissible confessions that were "compelled" by police coercion. 2 6 The Supreme Court, largely as a result of judicial
politics and compromises, 27 has indicated a preference for the due process
28
involuntary confession rule as the default rule where Miranda does not apply.
One might assume, therefore, that the same answer is appropriate abroad:
Because Miranda does not necessarily apply abroad, the primary test for
admissibility in this context is whether the confession was made "voluntarily"
in compliance with the Due Process Clause.
A close examination of this issue, however, reveals an intriguing dilemma. As
will be discussed below, when applying the appropriate tests for extraterritorial
application of the Bill of Rights to the due process involuntary confession rule,
one cannot escape the conclusion that the rule does not protect non-Americans

20. Id. at 1752-70.
21. Id. at 1754-80.

22. Id.
23. Id. For an argument that the courts should adopt an even broader Mirandaexception abroad than
I proposed in my recent Duke article, see generally M.K.B. Darmer, Beyond bin Laden and Lindh:
Confessions in an Age of Terrorism, 12 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 319 (2003) (arguing in favor of a
broad "foreign interrogations" exception to Miranda).
24. See infra notes 73-85 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 40-50 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 59-64, 82-85 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 82-88 and accompanying text; see also Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428,
434 (2000) (stating that "[wie have never abandoned this due process jurisprudence, and thus continue
to exclude confessions that were obtained involuntarily" and noting that Miranda added an additional
layer of protection based upon the privilege against self-incrimination).
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located beyond the borders of the United States. 29 But does this due process
void mean that FBI agents are free to coerce confessions from such suspects
through brute force and torture, and then introduce such confessions into
evidence at trial in the United States? As will be demonstrated in this Article,
the answer is no. Indeed, further exploration reveals that such suspects are not
stripped of all constitutional protections; rather, despite their lack of U.S.
citizenship and their location outside of the United States during their interrogation, these suspects are clearly protected by the privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination and its ban on "compelled" confessions. 3 °
But this answer gives rise to yet another important question: When is a
confession considered "compelled" in violation of the privilege? At the current
time, we have no clear answer. In the domestic setting, the due process rule
prohibiting "involuntary" confessions and the privilege's ban on "compelled"
confessions both apply to interrogations, and both theoretically regulate the
amount of coercion that the police may constitutionally apply to a suspect.
Given the choice of two doctrines, the Supreme Court has chosen to rely almost
exclusively on the due process involuntary confession rule instead of the
privilege as the basis for excluding problematic confessions. 3' As a result, the
Court has thoroughly developed the contours of the due process involuntary
confession rule, but has failed to establish a clear legal standard to determine
when a confession is "compelled" in violation of the privilege.32 However,
because the Due Process Clause is inapplicable in the international arena, this
choice between two doctrines is not available. Accordingly, the due process
involuntary confession rule will no longer shield the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination from judicial scrutiny in this context, and the courts will
be forced, once and for all, to determine what it means for a confession to be
compelled.
This Article considers the above quandary and offers a solution. Part I
explores in detail the constitutional confession rules that apply within the
United States, establishing the requisite background for the remainder of the
Article. Part II examines the tests for determining the extraterritorial application
of provisions of the Bill of Rights to non-Americans abroad and posits that,
under current Supreme Court precedent, non-Americans cannot claim the protection of the due process involuntary confession rule when they are located
beyond the borders of the United States. This Part demonstrates that the only
constitutional protection available to non-Americans abroad who are interrogated by FBI agents is the Fifth Amendment's prohibition of "compelled"
confessions under the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. Thus, the
international arena presents a new frontier for American constitutional confes-

29.
30.
31.
32.

See
See
See
See

infra notes
infra notes
infra notes
infra notes

208-51 and accompanying text.
135-57 and accompanying text.
83-85 and accompanying text.
73-85 and accompanying text.
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sion law that will force federal courts to forge a new understanding of the
privilege in the interrogation setting, and to define the meaning of "compelled."
Accordingly, Part III explores the historical origins, text, and policies of the
privilege, along with the relevant Supreme Court cases interpreting the privilege
in non-interrogation contexts, and offers a definition of "compelled" that is in
harmony with each. In so doing, this Part critiques the alternative definitions of
"compelled" offered thus far by other scholars. This analysis reveals that the
appropriate test for compulsion under the privilege is different from the due
process involuntary confession rule in several respects, and, in some ways, is
more protective of a suspect's rights than the due process standard. Finally, this
Article posits that this historically and textually accurate understanding of a
"compelled" confession should be used in future cases in U.S. courts when
determining the admissibility of confessions made by non-Americans to American law enforcement officials abroad.
I.

CONSTITUTIONAL CONFESSION LAW WITHIN THE TERRITORIAL BOUNDARIES OF
THE UNITED STATES

Several different constitutional doctrines operate in distinct but overlapping
spheres to regulate the admissibility of pretrial confessions in American courts.
Determining the extraterritorial application of these doctrines to non-Americans, however, demands a specific type of analysis that has not yet been fully
performed by courts or other scholars. This analysis requires examination of the
text, history, functions and policies of these doctrines, with particular focus on
certain temporal issues that ultimately control their applicability abroad. Before
turning to this analysis it is first necessary to create the appropriate backdrop.
Accordingly, this Part explores in some depth how the various confession
doctrines have evolved and currently function within the territorial boundaries
of the United States. This discussion is referred to repeatedly in later sections of
this Article, as distinctions are drawn and comparisons made.
A.

1897-1936:

THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST COMPULSORY SELF-INCRIMINATION EMERGES

The provision in the Bill of Rights that is the most textually relevant to the
issue of coerced confessions is the Fifth Amendment's privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. The Fifth Amendment states, in pertinent part: "No
person ...

shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against

himself. '33 The privilege means, in its simplest form, that a criminal defendant
cannot be called against his will to testify at trial or any other formal proceeding
about the acts with which he is criminally charged or about anything else that
might incriminate him.3 4 In 1897, the Supreme Court in Bram v. United
33. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
34. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444-45 (1972) (stating that the Fifth Amendment
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination "protects against any disclosures that the witness
reasonably believes could be used in a criminal prosecution or could lead to other evidence that might
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States35 first held that the privilege prohibits the introduction into evidence of a
confession that has been coerced by the police during a pretrial interrogation. 36
In this respect, the Court stated: "'[A] confession, in order to be admissible,
must be free and voluntary; that is, must not be extracted by any sort of threats
or violence, nor obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight, nor
by the exertion of any improper influence.' 37 The rationale behind this extension of the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination from the formal trial
setting to informal police interrogations is that if the police force a suspect to
give a confession against his will, and if that confession is later used against
him at trial, the suspect has essentially been compelled to testify against himself
at trial. 38 The holding in Bram, however, only restrained the conduct of federal
law enforcement officials; the privilege was not made applicable to the states
until more than half a century later.39
B.

1936-1966:

THE DUE PROCESS INVOLUNTARY CONFESSION RULE REPLACES THE

PRIVILEGE AGAINST COMPULSORY SELF-INCRIMINATION

In the 1930s, the Supreme Court began reviewing state court convictions in
which confessions obtained by the police through torture or other offensive
means had been admitted into evidence. 40 Because the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination had not been incorporated (and applied to the states)

be so used"); see also Brian R. Boch, Note, Fourteenth Amendment-The Standard of Mental
Competency to Waive ConstitutionalRights Versus the Competency Standard to Stand Trial, 84 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 883, 888-89 (1994) (observing that the Fifth Amendment's privilege against
self-incrimination protects individuals from being forced to "testify" against themselves).
35. 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
36. Id. at 565. Although the privilege against self-incrimination protects against the admission into
evidence of compelled statements of any type, this Article refers to all such statements with the generic
term "confession" for the sake of simplicity.
37. Id. at 542-43 (quoting 3 WILLIAM OLDNALL RUSSELL, A TREATISE ON CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS
478 (6th ed. 1896)).
38. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 461-66 (1966); see also Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433,
440 (1974) ("Although the constitutional language in which the privilege is cast might be construed to
apply only to situations in which the prosecution seeks to call a defendant to testify against himself at
his criminal trial, its application has not been so limited."); Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973):
The Amendment not only protects the individual against being involuntarily called as a
witness against himself in a criminal prosecution but also privileges him not to answer official
questions put to him in any other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the
answers might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings.
Charles J. Ogletree, Are Confessions Really Goodfor the Soul?: A Proposalto Mirandize Miranda, 100
HARv. L. REV. 1826, 1844 n.97 (1987) (discussing the rationale behind the extension of the privilege
against self-incrimination to pretrial interrogations). For a thorough discussion of the Bram decision,
see Darmer, supra note 23, at 321-28.
39. See Lawrence Herman, The Unexplored Relationship Between the PrivilegeAgainst Compulsory
Self-Incrimination and the Involuntary Confession Rule (Part I1), 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 497, 519-20 (1992)
[hereinafter Herman, PartI].
40. See generally Comment, The Coerced Confession Cases in Search of a Rationale, 31 U. CHI. L.
REV. 313 (1964) (discussing state cases involving coerced confessions reviewed by the Supreme Court
between the 1930s and 1960s).
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through the Fourteenth Amendment at that time, the only option that the Court
had at its disposal to exclude such problematic confessions was to create a
corollary to the privilege using a provision in the Bill of Rights that had
previously been deemed applicable to the states. 4' Accordingly, the Court
announced a new "voluntariness test"-this time rooted in the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment-and began using this doctrine rather
than the privilege to exclude troublesome confessions.42 The Supreme Court
described this "due process
involuntary confession rule" in Schneckloth v.
43
Bustamonte as

follows:

'The ultimate test remains ... the test of voluntariness. Is the confession the
product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker? If it is,
if he has willed to confess, it may be used against him. If it is not, if his will
has been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired,
the use of his confession offends due process.'
In determining whether a defendant's will was overborne in a particular
case, the Court has assessed the totality of all the surrounding circumstancesboth the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation.
Some of the factors taken into account have included the youth of the
accused, his lack of education, his low intelligence, the lack of any advice to
the accused of his constitutional rights, the length of the detention, the
repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning,4 4and the use of physical
punishment such as the deprivation of food or sleep.
41. See Herman, Part 11, supra note 39, at 519-20 (arguing that the Supreme Court's switch to due
process was caused by the privilege's inapplicability to the states).
42. See id; see also infra notes 173-203 and accompanying text. As a result of this reliance on the
Due Process Clause, it was unclear during that time whether Brain was still good law, and whether the
privilege against self-incrimination was still applicable to pretrial interrogations. In Haynes v. Washington, for example, the defendant was arrested for robbing a gas station and was taken into police custody.
373 U.S. 503, 505 (1963). Although he admitted his guilt orally, the local police refused to allow the
defendant to call his wife, to contact an attorney, or to be arraigned before a magistrate until he agreed
to sign a written confession. Id. at 506-11. Finally, after being held incommunicado with the outside
world for more than sixteen hours, the defendant agreed to sign the written confession. Id. at 504. At
trial, the defendant was convicted after the government introduced his written confession into evidence.
Id. After the defendant appealed his conviction to the Supreme Court, the Court held that the due
process test for whether a confession is admissible is whether it was made "'freely, voluntarily and
without compulsion or inducement of any sort."' Id. at 513 (quoting Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S.
613, 623 (1896)). To determine whether a confession is voluntarily made, a court must consider "all of
the attendant circumstances." Id. The Court held that the defendant "was alone in the hands of the
police, with no one to advise or aid him, and he had 'no reason not to believe that the police had ample
power to carry out their threats,' to continue, for a much longer period if need be, the incommunicado
detention." Id. at 514 (quoting Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 534 (1963)). Because the confession in
Haynes "was obtained in an atmosphere of substantial coercion and inducement created by statements
and actions of state authorities," id. at 513, the Court ruled that it had not been made voluntarily and
should not have been admitted into evidence, pursuant to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. at 515-18. Accordingly, the defendant's conviction was overturned. Id. at 520. The
Court in Haynes did not mention the privilege against self-incrimination.
43. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
44. Id. at 225-26 (quoting Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961)) (citations omitted).
See generally Welsh S. White, False Confessions and the Constitution: Safeguards Against Untrustwor-
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After creating this "due process involuntary confession rule," the Supreme
Court began using it to suppress involuntary confessions not only in state cases,
but in federal cases as well.45 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment was used in state cases, 46 and the nearly identical Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment was used in federal cases.4 7 As the Supreme
Court later reflected in Dickerson v. United States,48 "for the middle third of the
20th century our cases based the rule against admitting coerced confessions
primarily, if not exclusively, on notions of due process. We applied the due
process voluntariness test in 'some 30 different cases decided during [that]
era."' 49 During this period of due process supremacy, the Court virtually
ignored the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination and the Bram decision. It was therefore unclear whether Brain was still good law or even whether
the privilege was still considered applicable to pretrial interrogations.5 0
C.

1966:

THE PRIVILEGE RESURFACES IN MIRANDA V. ARIZONA

By the mid-1960s, the Court had grown dissatisfied with the due process
involuntary confession rule. This dissatisfaction reflected in part the highly
subjective nature of the test, which essentially required a district court both to
reconstruct minute details of an interrogation after the fact and to attempt to
divine the defendant's state of mind at the time of the interrogation in order to
determine whether his will had been overborne. 5 1 This subjectivity rendered the
test inherently difficult for the lower courts to apply. 52 In addition, the test
lacked the bright-line quality that the Court has always favored in criminal

thy Confessions, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 105 (1997) (discussing the history of the privilege against
self-incrimination and the involuntary confession rule).
45. See Debate, Will Miranda Survive?: Dickerson v. United States: The Right to Remain Silent, the
Supreme Court and Congress, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1165, 1168 (2000) ("in federal prosecutions the
Court relied upon the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to overturn confessions in federal
cases" during this era).
46. See Herman, Part11, supra note 39, at 500.
47. See Debate, supra note 45, at 1168; cf Herman, Part 11, supra note 39, at 500 (stating that, as
late as 1951, it was unclear whether the exclusion of voluntary confessions in federal cases was based
on the Fifth Amendment's self-incrimination provision, due process provision, or the common law
confession rule).
48. 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
49. Id. at 433-34 (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 223 (1973)). For a thorough
discussion of the due process voluntariness era, see Darmer, supra note 23, at 328-37.
50. See Steven J. Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 435, 437 (1987) (stating
that Brain was quickly forgotten, and thus, the privilege was seen by some as inapplicable to the police
interrogation setting); see also supra note 42 and accompanying text.
51. See Laurence A. Benner, Requiem for Miranda: The Rehnquist Court's Voluntariness Doctrine in
Historical Perspective, 67 WASH. U. L.Q. 59, 115 (1989) (suggesting that the due process test was
difficult to apply because it required a court to determine, as a matter of "psychological fact," whether
the defendant's will had been overborne).
52. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Confessions and the Court, 79 MICH. L. REV. 865, 869-75 (1981)
(discussing difficulties for courts posed by due process involuntary confession rule).
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procedure jurisprudence,5 3 which meant that police officers were left with
unclear and inconsistent messages as to how they should conduct interrogations.5 4 Consequently, the rule was repeatedly violated and was largely ineffective at curbing offensive police conduct. By the mid-1960s, the Court began
looking for a substitute doctrine. 55 After a short-lived experiment with the Sixth
Amendment's right to counsel in Escobedo v. Illinois,5 6 the Court settled on the
replacement it had been looking for in Miranda v. Arizona.57

In Miranda, the Supreme Court changed the inquiry from a voluntariness
standard to a bright-line warning/waiver requirement and, at least temporarily,
shifted the focus of confession law from the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments back toward the privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination. 58 In overruling prior cases that held the privilege inapplicable to the states, Miranda made clear that the privilege applies to state as well
as federal law enforcement officials and, like the due process involuntary
confession rule, protects suspects from coercion during the pretrial interrogation
stage of an investigation.5 9 In examining the privilege in the interrogation
context for the first time since Bram, the Miranda Court reformulated its
interpretation of the term "compelled"-the textual focal point of the privilege.
Although the Court did not provide a dictionary-type definition of when a

53. See Albert W. Alschuler, Bright Line Fever and the Fourth Amendment, 45 U. PITr. L. REv. 227
(1984) (discussing the Supreme Court's preference for "bright-line" criminal procedure rules); Wayne
R. LaFave, The Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect World: On Drawing "Bright Lines" and "Good
Faith," 43 U. Prrr. L. REV. 307, 321-23 (1982) (same).
54. See Alschuler, supra note 53, at 243-46 (arguing that due process involuntary confession rule
provided little guidance to police officers, and thus, was ineffective).
55. See Martin R. Gardner, The Emerging Good Faith Exception to the Miranda Rule-A Critique,
35 HASTINGS L.J. 429, 446-47 (1984) (discussing the Supreme Court's search for a substitute to the due
process involuntary confession rule).
56. 378 U.S. 478, 490-91 (1964). The decision held that:
[W]here ...the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has
begun to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect has been taken into police custody, the
police carry out a process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements, the suspect has requested and been denied an opportunity to consult with his lawyer,
and the police have not effectively warned him of his absolute constitutional right to remain
silent, the accused has been denied 'the Assistance of Counsel' in violation of the Sixth
Amendment to the Constitution.
57. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
58. Both Miranda and Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (overturning state commitment for
contempt where defendant was held because he exercised Fifth Amendment rights and refused to
answer questions), returned the focus to the privilege against self-incrimination. Miranda, 384 U.S. at
457-58; Malloy, 378 U.S. at 5-14; see also Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 434 (2000)
("[O]ur decisions in Malloy ... and Miranda changed the focus of much of the inquiry in determining
the admissibility" of confessions from a due process inquiry to a focus on the privilege against
self-incrimination); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 442-44 (1974) (noting that Miranda refocused
confession law on the privilege against self-incrimination).
59. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 463-64; see also Lawrence Herman, The Supreme Court, the Attorney
General, and the Good Old Days of Police Interrogation, 48 OHIo ST. L.J. 733, 733 n.5 (arguing that
Miranda made clear that the privilege applied in the interrogation setting).
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confession is "compelled," it made clear that the longstanding police practice of
interrogating suspects while in custody is a device that produces compelled
confessions--even when no torture or "third-degree" tactics of any kind are
utilized. 6' The Court based this holding on its belief that when a police officer
does nothing more than ask a question of a detained suspect, 61 that actcombined with the fact that the suspect is in custody and is therefore not free to
leave-creates an atmosphere that is "inherently coercive" to the suspect.62 The
atmospheric pressure that flows from custodial interrogation, by itself, is sufficient to constitute "compulsion" in violation of the privilege.63 Thus, although
the contours of the term were not made clear, the Court in Miranda interpreted
the term "compelled" very broadly. As the Court itself acknowledged in Miranda,
this new interpretation of "compelled" under the privilege was more protective
of suspects' civil liberties than the previous due process standard. 64
The Court in Miranda did not, however, go so far as to ban custodial
interrogation outright. Rather, the Court ruled that a police officer may engage a
suspect in custodial interrogation if he first takes affirmative steps to dispel the
coercion inherent in the setting so that the suspect will no longer feel compelled
to speak.65 The pressure may be dissipated by informing the suspect that he has
the right to remain silent, that his statements may be used against him at trial,
that he may have an attorney present during the interrogation, and that if he
cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him.6 6 The interrogating law
enforcement officer must then obtain a voluntary waiver of those rights from the
suspect before he may commence questioning.6 7 If the officer fails to do so, any
resulting statements will be considered compelled per se, and will be inadmissible at trial.6 8
Thus, since Miranda, there have been two separate but parallel confession
doctrines that apply to both federal and state governments alike: the due process
involuntary confession rule, and the privilege against compulsory self60. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467.
6. The Court later clarified that Miranda is triggered whenever the police engage a suspect in
custody in "interrogation." "Interrogation" has been defined as "words or actions on the part of the
police ... that [they] should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response." Rhode
Island v. Innis, 466 U.S. 291, 301 (1980).
62. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467-74.
63. Id.; see also Schulhofer, supra note 50, at 436 (discussing Miranda Court's definition of
compulsion, and its equation with custodial interrogation).
64. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 456-57 (acknowledging that the confessions suppressed in Miranda
and its companion cases might not be "involuntary in traditional terms"); Steven Penney, Theories of
Confession Admissibility: A Historical View, 25 AM. J. CRIM. L. 309, 369 (1998) (stating that the
Miranda Court's definition of "compulsion" was different than the meaning of "involuntary").
65. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467-74.
66. Id.; see also OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, "TRUTH IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE" SERIES,
(1986), reprinted in 22 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 437,

REPORT No. 1: THE LAW OF PRETRIAL INTERROGATION

485-91 (1989) (discussing the obligations that Mirandaplaces on police officers).
67. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475-76.
68. See id. at 476 (stating that the warnings are a "prerequisite to the admissibility of any statement
made by a defendant").
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incrimination with its ban on compelled confession. 69 At least from textual and
doctrinal standpoints, the privilege seems the more appropriate provision with
which to regulate confessions, as it speaks directly to the issue of compulsory
70
self-incrimination, while the Due Process Clauses are silent on the matter.
And, because the Court created the due process involuntary confession rule in
the 1930s simply to fill the void left by the privilege's inapplicability to the
states in that era,7 ' that doctrine no longer seems necessary now that the void
had been filled by the holding in Miranda. Thus, one might have reasonably
assumed that after Miranda the Court would have allowed the due process
involuntary confession rule to become dormant-or would have overruled it
entirely-and would have instead based the admissibility of confessions solely
on whether they were compelled in violation of the privilege.7 2 This approach
would have allowed the Court to hone its interpretation of the privilege and to
continue clarifying when a confession is "compelled." But this did not occur.

Instead, two things happened. First, the Court carved several exceptions to
Miranda that undermined its previously broad interpretation of the term "compelled." Second, the Court inexplicably retained the due process involuntary
confession rule as the default test for each of the newly-created scenarios where
the Miranda warning/waiver procedure was deemed inapplicable.
D.

POST-MIRANDA: THE PRIVILEGE ONCE AGAIN TAKES A BACKSEAT TO THE DUE

PROCESS INVOLUNTARY CONFESSION RULE

In its 1984 decision in New York v. Quarles,7 3 the Court created what has
become known as the "public-safety" exception to the Miranda doctrine. This
exception holds that when police officers have a pressing need to question a
suspect to avoid a potentially imminent danger to themselves or the public, they
may engage a suspect in custodial interrogation-and apply the limited amount
of pressure associated with it-without first administering Miranda warnings.7 4
In carving this exception, the Quarles Court instructed that the absence of
Miranda warnings prior to custodial interrogation does not mandate the conclusion that any resulting confession was "compelled" in violation of the privilege. This holding was directly at odds with one of the basic tenets of
Miranda: Because compulsion is inherent in custodial interrogations, a confes-

sion is considered compelled per se if it is obtained through custodial interroga69. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 433 (2000) (recognizing the existence of the two
parallel rules mentioned in the text).
70. See Herman, Part II, supra note 39, at 525 n.661 (arguing that the privilege, as opposed to the
Due Process Clause, is the textually more appropriate provision with which to regulate confessions).
71. See supra notes 40-49 and accompanying text.
72. See Herman, Part II, supra note 39, at 551 (arguing that, after Miranda, the Court had no need
for the due process involuntary confession rule, and thus should have replaced it entirely with the
privilege).
73. 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
74. See id. at 654-58.
75. See id.
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tion when the police do not first take steps to dissipate the atmospheric pressure
on the suspect. 76 The Quarles holding, therefore, unquestionably relaxed the
Court's interpretation of the term "compelled" in favor of greater police latitude, because it made clear that a finding of "compulsion" now requires some
undefined amount of pressure beyond the level inherent in custodial interrogation.
Quarles and the other Miranda-exception cases 77 have not completely overruled Miranda in the sense that the basic warning/waiver procedure has been
retained in most scenarios as the initial inquiry in determining the admissibility
of a confession. But the warnings have become detached from the privilege and
the concept of compulsion. Indeed, the Miranda-exception cases have made
clear that the warnings are not necessary to keep a confession from being
considered compelled; instead, they are now seen as a bright-line prophylactic
rule, designed to protect the privilege, that "sweeps more broadly than the
[privilege] itself."'78 In other words, the Miranda warnings requirement is now
viewed as a judicially created rule, similar to a common law rule of evidence,
designed to supply "practical reinforcement" 79 to the privilege by providing an
easy and effective litmus test to determine when a confession is admissible in
most situations. 80 In any situation where the Court has not carved a Miranda
exception, the mere failure to provide Miranda warnings will likely result in a
determination that the confession is inadmissible. The confession is inadmissible, however, only because the prophylactic rule has been violated, not
because the lack of warnings rendered the confession "compelled" in violation
of the privilege. It is this framework that made it feasible for the Court to create
exceptions to the Miranda doctrine because the Court could allow statements
taken in violation of Miranda to be introduced in certain circumstances, as long
as the underlying constitutional right-the privilege-was not infringed. In
doing so, the Court was carving exceptions only to a judicially created prophylac-

76. See supra notes 61-68 and accompanying text.
77. The Court moved away from Miranda's definition of "compulsion" in several other cases as
well, referred to here, together with Quarles, as the "Miranda-exceptioncases." In Harris v. New York,
401 U.S. 222 (1971), for example, the Court held that a statement taken from a defendant during
custodial interrogation where no Miranda warnings had been given may be used for impeachment
purposes at trial. Id. at 225-26. And in Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974), the Court ruled that
the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine does not apply to Miranda violations. Id. at 444-51. See
generally David A. Wollin, Policing the Police: Should Miranda Violations Bear Fruit?, 53 OHIO ST.
L.J. 805 (1992) (discussing the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine). These cases were based on the
same principle as Quarles-that custodial interrogation, by itself, does not amount to compulsion in
violation of the privilege. Harris,401 U.S. at 225-26; Tucker, 417 U.S. at 444-45.
78. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306 (1985).
79. Tucker, 417 U.S. at 444.
80. The Court's holding in Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000), that the Miranda
warnings have a "constitutional basis," id. at 439 n.3, does not change this analysis. See Godsey, supra
note 18, at 1742-52 (discussing Dickerson and its implicit adoption of the theory that rules of criminal
procedure can be both prophylactic and constitutional at the same time).
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tic rule, not to an underlying constitutional right.8 '
Even more important was the new test for admissibility that the Court set
forth in the Miranda-exception situations. Indeed, simply holding that the
privilege is no longer violated by mere custodial interrogation-because custodial interrogation no longer equates with compulsion--does not mean that
police officers are free to torture suspects to obtain confessions in these situations. Rather, it means that the pressure applied in Quarles and the other
Miranda-exception cases-custodial interrogation-did not constitute compulsion in violation of the privilege. The officers in those cases violated only the
Miranda rule-a prophylactic rule to which the Court is free to make exceptions as it sees fit. One might reasonably have assumed that the test for these
cases, therefore, would still be whether the confession was "compelled" in
violation of the privilege-whatever that term now means.
After Quarles, when is a confession considered "compelled"? The line that
Miranda drew in the sand at "custodial interrogation" has been erased and
moved back, but where has the new line been drawn? Inexplicably, the Supreme
Court has not drawn a new line.82 Instead, the Court has avoided the issue by
holding that where the Miranda doctrine is inapplicable, the "back-up" test for
the admissibility of a confession is not whether it was compelled in violation of
the privilege, but whether it was made voluntarily under the old due process
involuntary confession rule. 83 The Miranda-exception cases have continued to
insist that the privilege and its prohibition of compelled confessions remain
applicable to the pretrial interrogation context. 84 Yet, for reasons left unstated,
the Court has declined to provide clear guidance on the precise role of the
privilege in police interrogations, and has continued
instead to emphasize
85
pre-Mirandanotions of due process and voluntariness.
Why the doctrinal inconsistencies? Why has the Court fashioned a bi-layered

81. See supra note 80; see also M.K.B. Darmer, Lessons From the Lindh Case: Public Safety and
the Fifth Amendment, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 241, 268-81 (2002) (discussing post-Dickerson cases and
suggesting that Miranda remains a flexible, prophylactic rule after Dickerson).
82. See Benner, supra note 51, at 150-52 (arguing that the definition of "compulsion" in the
Miranda decision has been undermined by the Court's subsequent cases, which have not provided a
replacement); Susan R. Klein, Identifying and (Re)formulating Prophylactic Rules, Safe Harbors,and
Incidental Rights in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1030, 1073-74 (2001)
(noting that the Supreme Court has never provided a clear definition of "compulsion").
83. See, e.g., Tucker, 417 U.S. at 444-45 (citing a due process decision, Wong Sun v. United States,
371 U.S. 471 (1963), and finding that the fruits of the Miranda violation could be used because the
defendant's statements were not "involuntary"); Harris, 401 U.S. at 224 (holding that statements taken
in violation of Miranda may be used for impeachment purposes if made voluntarily); see also
Schulhofer, supra note 52, at 873 (noting that the due process involuntary confession rule "remains the
principal basis for adjudication in various confessions situations not governed by Miranda"). See infra
note 85 for more discussion on cases that explicitly address voluntariness.
84. See, e.g., Tucker, 417 U.S. at 442 (stating that the privilege applies in the police interrogation
setting).
85. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 437, 444 (2000) (recognizing that the due process
involuntary confession rule remains a viable confession doctrine, and operates as default rule to
Miranda); see, e.g., Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991) (applying the due process involuntary
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approach that favors a prophylactic rule based on the privilege in some scenarios, and the due process involuntary confession rule in others? Why did the
Court return to the due process involuntary confession rule at all after the
Miranda decision seemingly made that doctrine obsolete? 86 Although the Court
has never provided a satisfactory answer, at least one scholar has concluded that
the due process involuntary confession rule survived because certain members

of the Court were hostile to Miranda and hoped eventually to overrule it,
returning the focus of confession law back to the less restrictive due process
standard.8 7 Retaining the involuntary confession rule, and having it already
positioned as the default test where Miranda was inapplicable, would make that
transition easier. However, now that any idea of overruling Miranda has been
laid to rest with the Court's 2000 decision in Dickerson v. United States,88 we
are left with a state of constitutional confession law that is doctrinally unsatisfying and incomplete.
E. TODAY: THE BI-LAYERED APPROACH

In summary, despite the doctrinal inconsistency and gaps, a bi-layered procedure for determining the admissibility of confessions can be gleaned from the
leading cases. The Miranda doctrine, which is a prophylactic rule derived from
the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, remains the preliminary
litmus test for the admissibility of a confession in most scenarios. The due
process involuntary confession rule, on the other hand, serves as the default test
when Miranda does not apply. The two doctrines work in tandem as follows: If
the appropriate warnings were not given, then the confession must be suppressed pursuant to the prophylactic Miranda rule; however, if the facts fit

confession rule to situations where the privilege is not applicable); Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104
(1985) (same). See supra note 83 for more discussion of Mirandacases.
86. See Schulhofer, supra note 52, at 877-78 (noting that some assumed that the due process
involuntary confession rule would be "buried" after Miranda).
87. See Herman, supra note 59, at 737-39 (noting that, due to changes in composition, a majority of
the Court was generally hostile to the Miranda decision by 1972); Lawrence Herman, The Unexplored
Relationship Between the PrivilegeAgainst Compulsory Self-Incrimination and the Involuntary Confession Rule (Part 1), 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 101, 103 (1992) [hereinafter Herman, Part I] (noting that several
members of the Court disfavored Miranda a few years after the decision was published and probably
wished to return to the less restrictive due process standard); Herman, Part II, supra note 39, at 521,
527, 531 (same). The leading critic of Miranda, who for years has put forth arguments to support the
Court's hostility to Miranda, is former law professor and current United States District Judge Paul G.
Cassell. To sample Cassell's work on this subject, see generally Paul G. Cassell, The Paths Not Taken:
The Supreme Court's Failuresin Dickerson, 99 MtCH. L. REV. 898 (2001); Paul G. Cassell, The Statute
that Time Forgot: 18 U.S.C. Section 3501 and the Overhauling of Miranda, 85 IOWA L. REV. 175
(1999); Paul G. Cassell, Handcuffing the Cops? A Thirty-Year Perspective on Miranda's Harmful
Effects on Law Enforcement, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1055 (1998); Paul G. Cassell, Protecting the Innocent
from False Confessions and Lost Confessions-andfrom Miranda, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 497
(1998).
88. 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000) (holding that Congress does not have the authority to overrule
Miranda because Miranda announced a "constitutional rule"). See generally Godsey, supra note 18
(discussing whether Miranda was constitutionally required).
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within a Miranda exception, warnings are not required. The confession may be
inadmissible, despite the Miranda exception, under notions of due process when
it fails to satisfy the involuntary confession rule due to police coercion. The
privilege's ban on compelled confessions, meanwhile, remains applicable to
interrogations, but the Court has not defined its new meaning. Indeed, the
privilege (and its role in interrogations) has become lost and forgotten, as it has
once again taken a back seat to the due process involuntary confession rule.
II.

THE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL CONFESSION LAW TO
NON-AMERICANS

In a recent article, I presented arguments in favor of an international Miranda
exception. 89 This exception would apply when the following three circumstances are present: 1) the interrogation is conducted by American law enforcement agents; 2) the subject under interrogation is not an American citizen; and
3) the interrogation takes place beyond the borders of the United States. 90 The
next question, and the focal point of this Article, is which doctrine, if any,
controls the admissibility of confessions in the above circumstances in the place
of the Miranda doctrine? As will be demonstrated below, the due process
involuntary confession rule, which is the default rule in the United States for
situations in which Miranda does not apply, is inapplicable to interrogations of
non-Americans abroad. Section A demonstrates that although the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment 9' purports to apply to any "person," this
seemingly all-inclusive term, by itself, does not render the due process involuntary confession rule applicable to non-Americans abroad. Section B introduces
the "substantial connections" test used by the Supreme Court to determine the
applicability of certain constitutional rights to non-Americans abroad, and
concludes that this test similarly does not extend due process protections to such
suspects. Section c establishes that constitutional rights that can be categorized
as "trial rights" invariably protect non-Americans abroad, while "freestanding
civil liberties," as I term them, do not. This section then posits that the due
process involuntary confession rule is properly categorized as a freestanding
civil liberty, and therefore does not apply to non-Americans abroad. Section D
argues that the only constitutional protection available to non-Americans abroad
during interrogations by American law enforcement officials is the undefined
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination because the privilege is, in fact,

89. See generally Godsey, supra note 18.
90. Id. at 1710.
91. Up to this point in the Article, both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clauses
have been included in the discussion because both are relevant within the United States. See supra
notes 46-47 and accompanying text. However, because federal law enforcement officials typically
conduct investigations abroad, while state and local officials typically do not, the remainder of this
Article will refer only to the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which applies to the federal
government. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. In any event, the two Due Process Clauses are
effectively identical, so the analysis of one would apply to the other.
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a "trial right." Part III then explores the historical underpinnings, text, policies,
and Supreme Court interpretations of the privilege outside of the police interrogation context in an effort to formulate a conception of a "compelled" confession that comports with each element.
A. THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE'S REFERENCE TO "ANY PERSON" DOES NOT, BY ITSELF,
RENDER THE DUE PROCESS INVOLUNTARY CONFESSION RULE APPLICABLE TO
NON-AMERICANS ABROAD

The starting point for any question requiring an interpretation of a provision
in the Bill of Rights is the text itself. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, from which the involuntary confession rule is derived, provides
that "[n]o person ...

shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due

process of law.",92 One might reasonably argue that the seemingly all-inclusive
term "person" renders the Due Process clause universally applicable to all
human beings, wherever they may be located, in their dealings with the United
States government. Under such a construction, it would protect non-Americans
abroad from conduct by American officials that deprives them of any of the
rights embodied in due process, including the right to be free from having
involuntary confessions extracted from them. The Supreme Court, however, has
not interpreted the term "person" in this manner.
The seminal case on the matter, Johnson v. Eisentrager,93 involved twentyone German citizens who had served in the German armed forces in China
during World War II, had been convicted by American military tribunals in
China, and were serving their sentences in China under the control of American
military authorities. 94 They petitioned a federal court in the United States for a
writ of habeas corpus on the grounds that their trial, conviction, and imprisonment had not comported with the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.95 After the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
dismissed the petitions, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Fifth
Amendment's broad language-referring to "person"-meant that its application was not limited to American citizens or to individuals located within the
borders of the United States. 96 In reversing, the Supreme Court flatly rejected
this broad interpretation of the term "person," stating simply that "Itjhe Court of
Appeals has cited no authority whatever for holding that the Fifth Amendment
confers rights upon all persons, whatever their nationality, wherever they are
located and whatever their offenses.

97

Despite the apparent breadth of this holding, an argument could be made that
Eisentrager was intended to be limited to its wartime facts. An important
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

U.S. CONST. amend. V.
339 U.S. 763 (1950).
Id.at765-67.
Id. at 767.
Id. at 781-82.
Id. at 783.
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concern of the Court in deciding whether to extend the civil liberties contained
in the Bill of Rights to wartime enemies seemed to be the potentially crippling
effect such an extension would have on the ability of the United States to
conduct warfare. 98 The Court explored in detail the American tradition of
vesting the power to handle citizens of enemy nations exclusively in the
executive branch of government, and noted "[e]xecutive power over enemy
aliens, undelayed and unhampered by litigation, has been deemed, throughout
our history, essential to war-time security." 9 9 The Court held that "the nonresident enemy alien, especially one who has remained in the service of the enemy,
does not have even this qualified access to our courts, for he neither has
comparable claims upon our institutions nor could his use of them fail to be
helpful to the enemy."' 0 0 To vest nonresident alien enemies with the right to
bring suit in the United States alleging violations of the Bill of Rights would
"hamper the war effort and bring aid and comfort to the enemy. ' '1 °1
Recent cases, however, suggest that Eisentragershould not be interpreted so
narrowly. In the 1990 case United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, the issue was
whether the Fourth Amendment protects non-Americans abroad.' 0 2 In that case,
agents of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) arrested a Mexican
citizen and transported him to the United States to stand trial for smuggling
narcotics into the United States.' 0 3 Following his arrest, DEA agents searched
the defendant's home in Mexico without a warrant and found incriminating
evidence therein.'o4 Prior to trial, the defendant moved to suppress this evidence
on the ground that the DEA agents violated his Fourth Amendment rights by
searching his home without a warrant.' 0 5 In holding that the Fourth Amendment
does not protect non-Americans from unreasonable searches beyond the borders
of the United States, the Supreme Court cited Eisentragerfavorably, reiterating
that the word "person" in the Fifth Amendment does not automatically render
its protections applicable to non-Americans beyond the borders of the United
States.' 0 6 The Court in Verdugo-Urquidez completely ignored the wartime
setting of Eisentrageras a ground for distinguishing that case and expressed the
holding of Eisentragerbroadly as having emphatically "rejected the claim that
aliens are entitled to Fifth Amendment rights outside the sovereign territory of
10 7
the United States."'

98. Id. at 773-81.
99. Id. at 774 (emphasis added).
100. Id. at 776.
101. Id. at 779. The EisentragerCourt also noted that American servicemen are stripped of certain
constitutional rights when they enter the armed services. To allow wartime enemies to claim certain
constitutional rights would thereby put them in a better position than our own servicemen. Id. at 783.
102. 494 U.S. 259, 261 (1990).
103. Id. at 262.
104. Id. at 262-63.
105. Id. at 263.
106. Id. at 269.
107. Id.

HeinOnline -- 91 Geo. L.J. 869 2002-2003

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 91:851

Furthermore, in those cases where the Supreme Court has held that the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment protects certain non-Americans, it has
been careful to limit its holding to non-Americans who were located within the
territorial boundaries of the United States when the alleged due process violation occurred. For example, the Supreme Court stated in Mathews v. Diaz:'0 8
There are literally millions of aliens within the jurisdiction of the United
States. The Fifth Amendment, as well as the Fourteenth Amendment, protects
every one of these persons from deprivation of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law. Even one whose presence in this country is
unlawful, involuntary, or transitory is entitled to that constitutional protection. o9

Likewise, when the Supreme Court has ruled that the Due Process Clause
protects Americans located abroad, it has chosen its language carefully to limit
its holding to American citizens only. In Reid v. Covert," 0 the Supreme Court
stated in this respect: "When the [United States] Government reaches out to
punish a citizen who is abroad, the shield which the Bill of Rights and other
parts of the Constitution provide to protect his life and liberty should not be
stripped away just because he happens to be in another land."'
Thus, while the word "person" in the Fifth Amendment may at first glance
suggest that the Due Process Clause applies to any human being located
anywhere who is subjected to any form of state action by the United States
government-including non-Americans abroad-Supreme Court interpretations
of that term have undercut such an argument." l2 Accordingly, the text of the

108. 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
109. Id. at 77 (citations omitted); see also The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86, 101 (1903)
(holding that the due process clause protects an alien "who has entered this country, and has become
subject in all respects to its jurisdiction"); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896)
(holding that aliens "within the territorial jurisdiction" of the United States are protected by the due
process clause).
110. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
111. Id. at 6. The Court later reaffirmed in Verdugo-Urquidez that Reid's holding is limited to
American citizens. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 270.
112. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia was recently faced with the
task of construing these cases and their impact upon the phrase "No person" in the 2000 case of
Harbury v. Deutch, 233 F.3d 596 (D.C. Cir. 2000), rev'd on other grounds, 536 U.S. 403 (2002). In
Harbury, the plaintiff, an American citizen, was the wife of a Guatemalan citizen who had allegedly
been tortured and killed in Guatemala by members of the Guatemalan Security Forces. Id. at 598. The
complaint alleged that these acts had been performed at the direction of the CIA. Id. at 599. The
plaintiff brought a civil Bivens action for monetary damages against the U.S. government alleging,
among other things, that the government had violated her husband's due process rights. The due process
right that that the government had allegedly violated was not the ban on extracting involuntary
confessions at issue in this Article, but rather the prohibition against government conduct such as
torture that "shocks the conscience." Id. at 602-03. Yet because the ban on conduct that "shocks the
conscience" is derived from the Due Process Clause and therefore is controlled by the introductory
phrase "No person," Harbury 's interpretation of that phrase is instructive to the issue at hand.
The plaintiff argued in Harbury that the Due Process Clause applied to her husband, a non-American,
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Due Process Clause does not support the extraterritorial application of the
involuntary confession rule to non-Americans.
B. THE NARROW "SUBSTANTIAL CONNECTIONS" TEST RENDERS THE DUE PROCESS
INVOLUNTARY CONFESSION RULE INAPPLICABLE TO MOST NON-AMERICANS ABROAD

Although the Supreme Court has rejected the argument that the term "person"
renders the Due Process Clause applicable to non-Americans abroad, the Court
has not completely ruled out the possibility that such individuals could receive

due process protections in some circumstances. In Eisentrager,1 3 the Court
vaguely described a sliding scale in which protections in the Bill of Rights
attach to aliens to the degree that they have peacefully and voluntarily associ-

ated themselves with the United States. In this respect, the Court noted that
"[tihe alien, to whom the United States has been traditionally hospitable, has
been accorded a generous and ascending scale of rights as he increases his
identity with our society." ' 14 The Court suggested that the petitioners in Eisentrager were denied the protections of the Due Process Clause not just because
they were non-Americans situated outside of the United States when the alleged
constitutional violations occurred but also because, as German soldiers who had
"remained in the service of the enemy," ' " 5 they had no peaceful connection to
America6 prior to their most recent encounter with the United States govern1
ment.'
The Court expanded on this theme in Verdugo-Urquidez, ruling that the
17
Fourth Amendment did not apply to a search of the defendant's home.
Central to the Court's holding were the facts that the defendant was not an
even though he was in Guatemala at the time of the alleged torture. Id. at 602-04. She further argued
that Eisentrager's holding limited the application of that clause only in relation to non-Americans who
are enemies of war. Persuasive to the D.C. Circuit, however, was the fact that the Court in VerdugoUrquidez had refused to adopt such a narrow interpretation of Eisentrager.The D.C. Circuit noted that
the Verdugo-Urquidez Court had characterized its rejection of the extraterritorial application of the Fifth
Amendment in Eisentrageras "emphatic," stating:
'Such extraterritorial application of organic law would have been so significant an innovation
in the practice of governments that, if intended or apprehended, it could scarcely have failed
to excite contemporary comment. Not one word can be cited. No decision of this Court
supports such a view . . . . None of the learned commentators on our Constitution has even
hinted at it. The practice of every modern government is opposed to it.'
Id. at 604 (quoting Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 269 (quoting Eisentrager,339 U.S. at 770, 784-85)).
Recognizing that the Verdugo-Urquidez Court's "extended and approving citation of Eisentrager
suggests that its conclusions regarding extraterritorial application of the Fifth Amendment are not...
limited" to "enemy aliens during wartime," the D.C. Circuit held that the plaintiff's husband was not
protected by the Due Process Clause. Id.
113. 339 U.S. 763 (1950); see supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text.
114. Eisentrager,339 U.S. at 770.
115. Id. at 776. In contrast, the Supreme Court has held that when the U.S. government acts with
respect to American citizens located abroad, those citizens are entitled to the protections of the U.S.
Constitution. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 6 (1957); see supra note 13 and accompanying text.
116. Eisentrager,339 U.S. at 770-76.
117. See supra notes 102-07 and accompanying text.
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American citizen and that the search in question took place beyond the borders
of the United States. ' 8 But the Court suggested that these facts did not, by
themselves, dispose of the defendant's claim. Quoting the "ascending scale of
rights" language from Eisentrager,the Court denied the defendant's plea for
Fourth Amendment protection not simply because he was an alien, but also
because he "had no previous significant voluntary connection with the United
States."'

'9

Thus, in Eisentragerand Verdugo-Urquidez, the Supreme Court set forth a
test, sometimes called the "ascending scale of rights test"' 20 or the "substantial
connections" ' ' 2 test, by which aliens are granted certain constitutional protections to the extent they have voluntarily connected themselves with the United
States prior to the encounter with the United States government for which they
seek constitutional protection. The Supreme Court has yet to clarify, however,
what sort of "significant voluntary connection" with the United States would
suffice to trigger the protections in the Bill of Rights. Indeed, the Court
expressly declined to address the issue in Verdugo-Urquidez.122 The small
number of lower courts addressing the issue in the wake of Eisentrager and
Verdugo-Urquidez, however, have not read this language broadly. In one case,
for example, a court ruled that numerous prior business trips and vacations to

118.

See supra notes 102-07 and accompanying text.
119. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 271. Verdugo-Urquidez could be interpreted to require that an
alien seeking constitutional protection both "come within the territory of the United States" and have a
"previous significant voluntary connection with the United States." Id. Because all aliens would be on
trial for criminal charges within the United States when the issues addressed in this Article would arise,
the first requirement would always be satisfied. Thus, the only matter left unresolved would be whether
such an alien had the requisite prior connections with the United States. See, e.g., id. (holding that
because defendant was already within the United States for trial, the only issue was the extent of his
prior connections to the United States).
120. See, e.g., Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55, 66 (D.C. 2002) (discussing "ascending scale of
rights" test).
121. See infra notes 123-24.
122. 494 U.S. at 271-72 (refusing to decide whether a prolonged involuntary presence in the United
States, such as the serving of a prison sentence, would suffice). One could read the Supreme Court's
dicta on this issue in Verdugo-Urquidez and Wong Wing, see supra notes 102-12, as suggesting that an
alien's voluntary presence or residence in the United States at the time of the alleged constitutional
deprivation are prerequisites for the attachment of constitutional protections. See Ashkir v. United
States, 46 Fed. Cl. 438, 444-45 (2000) (holding that non-resident alien could not invoke the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment when alleged constitutional deprivation occurred beyond borders of
United States). Drawing the line at voluntary presence would, of course, be a clear, bright-line rule.
However, the Court's refusal to anchor the ascending scale of rights test at such a clear line of
demarcation, as well as its continued use of the vague "ascending scale of rights" language, strongly
suggest that an alien could attain the protections in the Bill of Rights through significant prior
connections with the United States other than residence or a voluntary presence at the time of the
alleged constitutional violation. Indeed, the cases cited infra at notes 123-24 implicitly ruled that
voluntary presence or residence in the United States at the time of the constitutional violation are not
prerequisites when the courts dutifully applied the substantial connections test to non-Americans who
were not present in the United States when the alleged constitutional deprivations occurred. These
courts therefore assumed that the requisite substantial connections could be attained short of physical
presence or residence.
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the United States were insufficient. 2 3 In another case a different court ruled that
a history of regular trips to America to visit relatives did not meet the "substan-

tial connections" test. 124
Thus, only in rare cases would the "substantial connections" test protect
non-Americans during interrogations by American law enforcement officials
abroad. Accordingly, this test does not generally support the extraterritorial

25
application of the due process involuntary confession rule to non-Americans. 1
C. PROVISIONS IN THE BILL OF RIGHTS THAT HAVE BEEN INTERPRETED AS "TRIAL
RIGHTS" INVARIABLY PROTECT NON-AMERICANS ABROAD, WHILE "FREESTANDING
CIVIL LIBERTIES" DO NOT

Provisions in the Bill of Rights that have been interpreted as "trial rights"
protect all defendants, regardless of alienage, during their trials in the United

123. United States v. Fantin, 130 F Supp. 2d 385, 391 (W.D.N.Y. 2000) (applying substantial
connections test and holding that alien's prior contacts with United States were "either too transitory or
stale" to satisfy test).
124. Am. Immigration Lawyers Ass'n v. Reno, 18 F. Supp. 2d 38, 60 n.17 (D.D.C. 1998) (applying
substantial connections test and finding contacts insufficient); see also Rasul, 215 F. Supp. 2d. at 72
(applying Eisentrager and substantial connections test and finding that detainees at Guantanamo Bay,
brought to the U.S. military base in Cuba from Afghanistan, were not entitled to protections of the Bill
of Rights). But see Haitian Ctrs. Council v. Sale, 823 F. Supp. 1028, 1042 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding that
two-year confinement at American military base in Cuba of aliens seeking political asylum in the
United States, and screened by the United States for that purpose, established substantial connection to
the United States giving rise to due process rights).
125. A line of Supreme Court cases known as the "Insular Cases" appears at first glance to suggest
that non-Americans abroad are never protected by the Due Process Clause, but upon closer inspection
these cases are distinguishable. In the Insular Cases, the Supreme Court held that certain constitutional
rights do not apply to citizens of certain territories of the United States. See Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258
U.S. 298, 304-05 (1922) (holding that Sixth Amendment right to jury trial was inapplicable in Puerto
Rico); Ocampo v. United States, 234 U.S. 91, 98 (1914) (holding that Fifth Amendment grand jury
provision was inapplicable in Philippines); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 149 (1904) (holding
that right to jury trial was inapplicable in Philippines); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, 215-18
(1903) (holding that provisions on indictment by grand jury and jury trial were inapplicable in Hawaii);
Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 287 (1901) (holding that the Revenue Clauses of the Constitution
were inapplicable to Puerto Rico). In these cases, however, the question was whether Congress, in
territorializing such places as the Philippines and Puerto Rico, intended to make them so incorporated
into the United States that the entire Constitution would apply therein. In each case, the Court
interpreted the treaties and laws in question that gave the United States a degree of sovereign power
over these areas, and answered the question in the negative. See, e.g., Ocampo, 234 U.S. at 98-99.
Thus, Congress did not intend that citizens of the Philippines, for example, were to be considered so
much a part of the United States that they could claim protection of the U.S. Constitution. Id. In
contrast, when a non-American is present within the borders of the United States, as in Plyler, Bridges,
Russian Volunteer Fleet, Wong Wing, and Yick Wo, his position is markedly better, as the application of
the Constitution to such an individual does not turn on the interpretation of treaties or congressional
intent. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 268 (1990) (discussing the Insular
Cases); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 132 (1945); Russian Volunteer
Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 481 (1931); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896); Yick
Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); see also Michael A. Cabotaje, Comment, Equity Denied:
Historicaland Legal Analyses in Support of the Extension of U.S. Veterans' Benefits to Filipino World
War 11 Veterans, 6 ASIAN L.J. 67, 88-96 (1999) (discussing the Insular Cases).
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States.' 26 This is, at first glance, an unremarkable statement. When an alien
defendant is on trial in a federal courtroom in the United States, no one would
dispute the fact that he is afforded the right to an attorney, the right to call
witnesses in his defense and all of the other constitutional rights that are
synonymous in this country with the right to a fair trial.' 27 But the next step is
key: When the vindication of a trial right requires the court to make findings of
fact regarding police investigative conduct that took place prior to trial, the
location where that police conduct took place becomes legally irrelevant. Stated
differently, constitutional rights classified as trial rights can be backwardlooking and, as a result, can attach at trial and then extend their protections
retroactively to the pretrial investigation stage. When this occurs, it cloaks
non-Americans abroad with constitutional protection after the fact, even though
they were located outside of the United States and thus were not initially
of Rights at the time that the alleged constitutional
protected by the Bill
28
1
occurred.
violation
Perhaps a hypothetical can best illuminate this point. To explore the hypothetical, a few terms must be defined as they are used in this Article. A "trial right" is
a constitutional right that attaches only in the criminal trial setting. Its concern
is to ensure a fair and accurate criminal trial process, or to further a trial-related
policy. Thus, a violation of a trial right can occur only at trial. The other type of
constitutional right is a "freestanding civil liberty." A freestanding civil liberty
is not concerned with ensuring fair and accurate trials; rather, it protects
individuals generally from government overreaching in a variety of non-trial
settings-from the private home to the public street corner. Accordingly, a
freestanding civil liberty can be triggered or violated in situations outside of the
criminal trial context. Now that these terms have been defined, we may proceed
with the hypothetical.
Suppose that an FBI agent in Italy interrogates an Italian citizen who is
suspected of running a website that allows the suspect to traffic child pornography into the United States. The FBI agent deprives the suspect of food and sleep
for seventy-two hours, until the suspect breaks down and confesses involuntarily. The suspect is then brought to the United States and charged with various
child pornography violations. At trial, the involuntary confession is admitted
into evidence and the suspect is convicted. On appeal, the crucial question for
126. This point is so widely accepted and practiced that courts rarely feel the need to state it. See
generally Gerald L. Neuman, Whose Constitution?, 100 YALE L.J. 909 (1991) (citing cases and
discussing American courts' practice of affording alien defendants full panoply of constitutional trial
rights during their criminal trials). See also supra notes 11-12, 108; supra note 109 and accompanying
text; infra note 172 and accompanying text. As an Assistant United States Attorney, I prosecuted
numerous illegal aliens. Never did the Court or the United States Attorney's Office suggest that such
individuals were stripped of constitutional trial rights because of their alien status. Indeed, to hold
otherwise would work a fundamental change in American criminal trials, establishing a separate set of
trial rules that would apply to non-Americans.
127. See supra note 126.
128. See infra notes 135-50, 173-207 and accompanying text.
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purposes of this Article is whether the due process involuntary confession rule
grants a freestanding civil liberty, which would mean that the due process
violation occurred in Italy at the time the coercive interrogation took place, or
whether the due process involuntary confession rule grants a trial right, which
would mean that the constitutional violation occurred later in the United States
when the government introduced the involuntary confession into evidence at the
suspect's trial.
The answer to the above question determines whether or not the due process
involuntary confession rule applies extraterritorially to non-Americans. The Bill
of Rights protects non-Americans against constitutional deprivations that occur
within the United States. 1 2 9 Non-Americans are not protected by the Bill of
Rights, however, when the alleged constitutional violation occurs outside of the
United States, unless they satisfy the "substantial connections" test.130 But
non-Americans are protected by constitutional "trial rights" at their trials in the
United States, even when vindication of such rights requires courts to review
the pretrial conduct of law enforcement officials in foreign countries. 31 Because violations of freestanding civil liberties occur only at the time of the law
enforcement officials' alleged unlawful conduct, however, these rights do not
protect non-Americans when the alleged violation occurs completely beyond
the borders of the United States. 132 Thus, as explored in more detail below, if
the involuntary confession rule grants a freestanding civil liberty, it would
afford the non-American defendant no protection in an American court under
Verdugo-Urquidez unless the defendant satisfies the narrow "substantial connections" test; because the constitutional violation in the above hypothetical occurred solely in Italy. 133 If the involuntary confession rule grants a trial right,
however, it follows that the constitutional violation in the above hypothetical
occurred solely at the defendant's trial within the territorial boundaries of the
United States when the government introduced the involuntary confession into
evidence. Consequently, the suspect would have a right to exclude the confession, despite lack of American citizenship, pursuant to the line of cases previously discussed that extend constitutional trial rights to non-Americans.131
Before attempting to answer the aforementioned question, it is necessary first
to explore an example of a trial right, and alternatively, an example of a
freestanding civil liberty. This process will set the necessary parameters for
properly categorizing the due process involuntary confession rule in a subsequent discussion.

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

See supra
See supra
See supra
See supra
See supra
See supra

notes
notes
notes
notes
notes
notes

12, 108-09, 126 and accompanying text.
93-125 and accompanying text.
102-07; infra notes 135-57, 173-207 and accompanying text.
102-07; infra notes 158-72 and accompanying text.
102-07; infra notes 208-51 and accompanying text.
12, 108-09, 126 and accompanying text.
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1. The Privilege Against Compulsory Self-Incrimination Is An Example Of A
Trial Right.
An example of a "trial right" is the Fifth Amendment's privilege against
self-incrimination. Using a strict interpretation of the text of the Fifth Amendment,135 the Supreme Court has held that the privilege against self-incrimination is violated only when defendants become witnesses against themselves at
their criminal trials.' 36 Therefore, if a law enforcement officer used brute force
and torture to extract a compelled confession from a suspect, the officer would
not have violated the privilege against self-incrimination at the time of the
confession because the suspect would not yet have testified at trial. 137 If,
however, the suspect were later prosecuted and the government introduced the
involuntary confession into evidence, the suspect then would be considered a
"witness against himself' in a "criminal case," and the Fifth Amendment would
38
be violated at the time the confession was admitted. 1
The distinction was first made clear in the line of federal cases involving
13 9
governmental grants of immunity to witnesses. In Kastigar v. United States,
for example, the petitioners were subpoenaed to testify as witnesses before a
federal grand jury.' 40 The petitioners invoked the privilege against selfincrimination and refused to testify. 141 In response, the government applied to
the United States District Court for the Central District of California for an
order pursuant to a federal statute that granted the petitioners immunity from
prosecution. 142 After the district court granted immunity to the petitioners,
however, they still refused to testify and were held in contempt and detained

135. "No person ... in any criminal case shall be compelled to be a witness against himself." U.S.
CONST. amend. V.
136. Chavez v. Martinez, 123 S.Ct. 1994, 2001-04 (2003); Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 264.
137. Chavez, 123 S.Ct. at 2001-04; Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 264; see also infra notes 139-57
and accompanying text.
138. Chavez, 123 S.Ct. at 2001-04; see Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 264; Gardner, supra note 55,
at 442 (arguing that text of privilege dictates that it is a trial right); see also infra notes 139-57 and
accompanying text.
139. 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
140. Id. at 442.
141. Id.
142. Id. In response to the government's request, the district court granted immunity to the
petitioners, id., pursuant to the authority vested in it by 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (2000), which states:
Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination, to testify
or provide other information in a proceeding before or ancillary to-(I) a court or grand jury
of the United States, (2) an agency of the United States, or (3) either House of Congress, a
joint committee of the two Houses, or a committee or a subcommittee of either House, and the
person presiding over the proceeding communicates to the witness an order issued under this
title, the witness may not refuse to comply with the order on the basis of his privilege against
self-incrimination; but no testimony or' other information compelled under the order (or any
information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information) may be
used against the witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false
statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the order.
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until they agreed to do SO. 14 3 In discussing the constitutionality of statutes that
authorize the government to immunize witnesses and then compel their testimony, the Supreme Court made clear that the "sole concern" of the privilege
was not the forcible extraction of statements; rather, the privilege only prohibits
such statements from being introduced at a trial or similar proceeding to inflict
criminal penalties upon the person who was "compelled" to speak. 144 Once
witnesses have been granted immunity, ensuring that their statements will not
be introduced into evidence against them at a criminal trial, the privilege against
self-incrimination no longer prohibits the government from forcibly extracting
incriminating statements from them. 145 The Supreme Court concluded in Kastigar that when witnesses are granted immunity and still refuse to testify, the
government may forcibly compel their testimony-without violating their Fifth
rights-by detaining them until they agree to take the witness
Amendment
46
stand. 1
This distinction is derived not only from the pivotal word "witness" and
phrase "criminal case" in the text of the privilege, but because one of the
policies behind the privilege is to further the truth-seeking function of the
criminal trial process, as "compelled" confessions are likely to be unreliable and
might lead juries in many cases to convict innocent defendants. As the Supreme
147
Court explained in the 1993 case Withrow v. Williams:
Nor does the Fifth Amendment trial right protected by [the privilege] serve
some value necessarily divorced from the correct ascertainment of guilt. A
system of criminal law enforcement which comes to depend on the confession
will, in the long run, be less reliable and more subject to abuses than a system
relying on independent investigation. By bracing against the possibility of
unreliable statements ... [the privilege] serves to guard against the use of

unreliable statements at trial. 148

is
Thus, the privilege is a trial right because as a matter of text and policy it 49
1
statements.
compelled
of
trial
at
"use"
government's
the
with
concerned only
143. Kastigar,406 U.S. at 442.
144. Id. at 453.
145. Id.; see also Mahoney v. Kesery, 976 F.2d 1054, 1061-62 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting that Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination does not protect witness after he or she is granted
immunity).
146. 406 U.S. at 442.
147. 507 U.S. 680 (1993).
148. Id. at 692 (citations and internal quotations omitted). The above quotation substitutes the word
"privilege" for the word "Miranda." Because Miranda was designed solely to protect the privilege, see
supra notes 51-68 and accompanying text, the two words are interchangeable in this context. See also
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 240 (1973) (stating that the Miranda Court "made it clear
that the basis for the decision was the need to protect the fairness of the trial itself."); Gardner, supra
note 55, at 437 (distinguishing between the privilege, which is based on trial-related concerns, and the
Fourth Amendment, which is not).
149. The Court seemed to undermine the privilege's focus on reliability in Colorado v. Connelly,
479 U.S. 157 (1986), when it stated: "The sole concern of the [privilege against self-incrimination], on
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As the Supreme Court said in Verdugo-Urquidez when contrasting the privilege
with the Fourth Amendment: "The privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment is a fundamental trial right of criminal defendants.
Although conduct by law enforcement officials prior to trial may ultimately
impair that right, a constitutional violation occurs only at trial" when
the
5
coerced statements are introduced into evidence against the defendant. 1 1
The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed this principle in the case of Chavez v.
Martinez.'5 1 In Chavez, the petitioner, Martinez, brought a civil suit for monetary damages under Title 42 U.S.C. Section 1983152 against a police sergeant. 15 3 Martinez argued that his rights under the privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination had been violated at the moment that the sergeant in question
subjected him to a coercive interrogation.' 54 Martinez made this claim despite
the fact that, following the interrogation, he was never charged with having
committed a crime. 5 5 The Supreme Court rejected Martinez' claim, stating:
"Martinez was never made to be a 'witness' against himself in violation of the
Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause because his statements were never
admitted as testimony against him in a criminal case."' 156 The Chavez decision
thus further solidifies the notion that the privilege against compulsory self-

which Miranda is based, is governmental coercion." Id. at 170; see also Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364,
375 (1986) ("The privilege against self-incrimination enjoined by the Fifth Amendment is not designed
to enhance the reliability of the factfinding determination; it stands in the Constitution for entirely
independent reasons"). But the Court then returned the privilege to its reliability roots in the 1993 case
Withrow v. Williams when it stated: "By bracing against the possibility of unreliable statements in every
instance of incustody interrogation, [the privilege] serves to guard against the use of unreliable
statements at trial." 507 U.S. 680, 692 (1993) (internal quotations omitted). This Article asserts in Part
Ill that the "reliability rationale" was grafted onto the privilege as a result of the Court's flawed
historical analysis in the 1897 case of Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897). See infra notes
312-28 and accompanying text. An analysis of the historical underpinnings of the privilege suggests
that courts interpreting this particular provision should be wholly unconcerned with reliability. See infra
notes 309-28 and accompanying text.
Regardless of the Court's vacillations on this point of policy, the privilege will always be considered
a trial right for two reasons distinct from policy. First, as we have seen, the text of the privilege dictates
that it is a trial right. Second, to convert the privilege into a freestanding civil liberty would overrule the
line of cases dealing with government grants of immunity, which would fundamentally alter the
American criminal justice system. Even if the Court desired to overrule these cases, which is unlikely, it
would still be bound by the text of the privilege. Thus, the privilege's status as a trial right is secure.
150. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264 (1990) (citations omitted); see also
Charlotte E. ex rel. Deshawn E. v. Safir, 156 F.3d 340, 346 (2d Cir. 1998) ("Even if it can be shown that
a statement was obtained by coercion, there can be no Fifth Amendment violation until that statement is
introduced against the defendant in a criminal proceeding."); United States v. Bin Laden, 132 F. Supp.
2d 168, 181-82 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (same); Godsey supra note 18 , at 1724-29 (2002) (collecting cases
and noting that privilege is not violated until statements are introduced at trial). See also Darmer, supra
note 23, at 348-51 (arguing that the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination grants a trial right).
151. 123 S.Ct. 1994 (2003).
152. See infra note 241 and accompanying text.
153. Chavez, 123 S.Ct. at 1999.
154. Id. at 1999-2000.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 2001.
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57
incrimination is a "trial right."1

2. The Fourth Amendment Is An Example Of A Freestanding Civil Liberty
The Fourth Amendment, in contrast to the privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination, is a freestanding civil liberty. This is because it was designed
to protect privacy interests outside of the trial setting, such as in a private home,
and not as a rule of procedure designed to monitor and further the truth-seeking
function and fairness of criminal trials. In Verdugo- Urquidez, for example, DEA
agents seized evidence from the alien-defendant's Mexican home without a
warrant and later introduced that evidence at trial. 158 The DEA's failure to
follow the requirements of the Fourth Amendment in that case, however, did not
render the evidence unreliable, thereby casting doubt on the fairness of the trial
or the validity of the defendant's conviction. The evidence (drug-dealing notes
and ledgers) did not suddenly change in form or otherwise become less probative of the fact that the defendant was a drug dealer simply because the DEA
seized it without a warrant. As the Supreme Court has noted in this respect,
"The protections of the Fourth Amendment are of a wholly different order [than
the privilege against self-incrimination], and have nothing whatever to do with
promoting the fair ascertainment of truth at a criminal trial .

. .

. '[T]here is no

likelihood of unreliability or coercion present in a search-and-seizure case. 9159
The Court has further elaborated this point, stating that the Fourth Amendment
and its exclusionary rule cannot be thought "to enhance the soundness of the
criminal process by improving the reliability of evidence introduced at trial.
Quite the contrary ... the evidence excluded [under the Fourth Amendment's
exclusionary rule] is typically reliable and often the' 60most probative information
bearing on the guilt or innocence of the defendant."'
Because of the policies supporting it, a violation of the Fourth Amendment is
seen as occurring at the moment the unlawful search and seizure takes placenot, as with the privilege, at trial when the evidence seized is introduced. The
alien-defendant in Verdugo-Urquidez, for example, asserted that he could claim

157. See infra note 245-50 and accompanying text.
158. 494 U.S. at 262-63.
159. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 242 (1973) (quoting Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S.
618, 638 (1965)); see also Gardner, supra note 55, at 437 (discussing difference between privilege and
Fourth Amendment).
160. Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 691 (1993) (internal quotations omitted). As the Supreme
Court stated in Stein v. New York:
Coerced confessions are not more stained with illegality than other evidence obtained in
violation of law. But reliance on a coerced confession vitiates a conviction because such a
confession combines the persuasiveness of apparent conclusiveness with what judicial experience shows to be illusory and deceptive evidence. A forced confession is a false foundation for
any conviction, while evidence obtained by illegal search and seizure, wire tapping, or larceny
may be and often is of the utmost verity. Such police lawlessness therefore may not void state
convictions while forced confessions will do so.
346 U.S. 156, 192 (1953).
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the protection of the Fourth Amendment because he was present in the United
States during his trial and the government was attempting to introduce evidence
obtained during a warrantless search at his trial. 16 ' The defendant's argument
would undoubtedly have had merit if the Fourth Amendment were considered a
trial right that is violated when the government introduces evidence seized in
violation of its dictates.' 62 The Supreme Court, however, disagreed with the
defendant's characterization of Fourth Amendment protections, and in the process cast the Fourth Amendment as a freestanding civil liberty. 16 3 Based on the
policies underlying the Fourth Amendment, the Court held that a violation is
"fully accomplished" at the time of the unlawful search in question-not when
the evidence is introduced later at trial. 164 The defendant's home was located in
Mexico, and as a result the government conduct that was alleged to be unconstitutional occurred solely outside of the United States. 165 Because the defendant
was a non-American who could claim only an alleged violation of the Constitu66
tion outside of the United States, he had no Fourth Amendment protection. 1
Because a violation of the Fourth Amendment is fully accomplished at the
time of the search or seizure, the introduction at trial of evidence seized in
violation of the Fourth Amendment does not constitute a second, independent
violation. Instead, evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment is
excluded as a result of a judicially created exclusionary rule, similar to a
common law rule of evidence, which is designed to penalize police officers and
in the future. As the
to deter them from violating the Fourth Amendment
67
1
Leon:
v.
States
United
in
held
Court
Supreme
The Fourth Amendment contains no provision expressly precluding the use of
evidence obtained in violation of its commands, and an examination of its
origin and purposes makes clear that the use of fruits of a past unlawful search
or seizure works no new Fourth Amendment wrong. The wrong condemned
by the Amendment is fully accomplished by the unlawful search or seizure
itself; and the exclusionary rule is neither intended nor able to cure the
invasion of the defendant's fights which he has already suffered. The [Fourth
Amendment exclusionary] rule thus operates as a judicially created remedy
designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment fights generally through its deter-

161. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 264.
162. See id. at 264-75.
163. Id. at 285-86.
164. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 264; see also Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357,
362 (1998) (Fourth Amendment violation "fully accomplished" at time of search or seizure); Arizona v.
Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 10 (1995) (same); NationsBank Corp. v. Herman, 174 E3d 424, 429 (4th Cir. 1999)
(same); Lamont v. Woods, 948 F.2d 825, 834 (1991) (2d Cir. 1991) (same); Marshall v. Whittaker
Corp., 610 F.2d 1141, 1145 n.8 (3d Cir. 1979) (same); Elizabeth A. Corradino, Note: The Fourth
Amendment Overseas: Is ExtraterritorialProtection of ForeignNationals Going Too Far?, 57 FORDHAM
L. REV. 617, 623 n.39 (1989) (same).
165. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 274-75.
166. Id.
167. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
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rather than a personal constitutional right of the party agrent effect,
68
grieved. 1

Thus, the Fourth Amendment and the privilege against compulsory selfincrimination are different in the sense that a Fourth Amendment violation
occurs, if at all, when the "unreasonable" search takes place. The Fifth Amendment's privilege, on the other hand, can be violated only in a courtroom setting
when the defendant's coerced confession is introduced and he becomes a
"witness" against himself. 169 The privilege, therefore, contains its own constiturule, as its only function is to exclude evidence at
tionally based exclusionary
70
'
trials.
criminal
Once it is understood that a violation of the Fifth Amendment's privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination does not occur until trial, the privilege
and other "trial rights" in the Constitution can be distinguished from the
constitutional rights at stake in cases in which the Supreme Court adopted the
"substantial connections" approach. In Verdugo-Urquidez and Eisentrager for
example, the alleged constitutional violations occurred outside of the United
States.' 7' In fact, in connection with the privilege and other constitutional trial
rights, it becomes apparent that the location of the trial, not the location of the
interrogation, is the dispositive factor. If a non-American who confessed abroad
is later tried in the United States, the question in such a case is not whether the
privilege applies abroad, but whether non-Americans located within the boundaries of the United States, for the purpose of attending their criminal trial, are
protected by the privilege. Undoubtedly, they are. 172

168. Id. at 906 (citations and internal quotations omitted); see Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 223
(1983) (Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule not constitutionally based); United States v. Calandra,
414 U.S. 338, 347-48 (1974) (same); see also Donald Dripps, The Casefor the ContingentExclusionary Rule, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 45-46 (2001) (discussing history of Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule, and noting that it has been interpreted as a judicially created rule not based in the Fourth
Amendment itself); George C. Thomas III, Judges Are Not Economists and Other Reasons To Be
Skeptical of Contingent Suppression Orders:A Response to ProfessorDripps, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 47,
49-50 (2001) (same).
169. See supra notes 135-57 and accompanying text.
170. See United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 443 (1976) (stating that the privilege contains a "direct
command against the admission of compelled testimony" while the Fourth Amendment does not); Peter
Arenella, Thirteenth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: UnitedStates Supreme Court and Courts of
Appeals 1982-83: Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure: The Warren and Burger Courts'
Competing Ideologies, 72 GEO. L.J. 185, 239 (1983) (noting that the privilege "contains its own
constitutionally-mandated exclusionary remedy"); Gardner, supra note 55, at 339 (same).
171. In Eisentragerthe alleged constitutional injury was fully accomplished in China. Johnson v
Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 765-67 (1995). In Verdugo-Urquidez, the alleged injury was fully accomplished in Mexico. Verdugo-Urquidez,494 U.S. at 262-63.
172. The concept that aliens on trial in the United States are protected by constitutional trial rights is
so well established that it is rarely questioned. See supra note 126; see, e.g., United States v.
Maikovskis, No. M18-304, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19113, at *18 (S.D.N.Y Mar. 10, 1978) (stating that
privilege against self-incrimination protects aliens during court proceedings in United States). Thousands of illegal aliens are currently housed in American prisons after having been tried in American
courtrooms. See Can'tAccelerate Deportations,NAT'L L.J., Mar. 22, 1999, at A8 (stating that thousands
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The crucial question for purposes of this Article, therefore, is whether the due
process involuntary confession rule is a trial right like the privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination, or a freestanding civil liberty like the Fourth
Amendment's protection from unreasonable searches and seizures. If it is a trial
right, then non-Americans on trial in the United States will have the right to
exclude involuntary confessions regardless of the location where the pretrial

confession was made. If the due process involuntary confession rule is considered a freestanding civil liberty, however, then non-Americans will be unsuccessful in excluding involuntary confessions made to FBI agents beyond the borders
of the United States.
D. THE DUE PROCESS INVOLUNTARY CONFESSION RULE IS A FREESTANDING CIVIL
LIBERTY, AND THEREFORE DOES NOT APPLY TO NON-AMERICANS ABROAD
UNLESS THEY SATISFY THE SUBSTANTIAL CONNECTIONS TEST

As the above discussion makes clear, a constitutional right can be categorized
as either a trial right or a freestanding civil liberty by examining its text and the
policies supporting the right. The privilege against compulsory self-incrimination is considered a trial right because it was designed to protect trial-related
interests, and because the text demands that it is a trial right. The Fourth
Amendment is a freestanding civil liberty because it was designed to protect
privacy outside of the trial setting. Does the due process involuntary confession
rule grant an individual a freestanding civil liberty to be free in any setting from
the type of government pressure that yields involuntary confessions? Is the
involuntary confession rule in essence a "roving" constitutional right, like the
Fourth Amendment, designed to protect the right of suspects not to be bothered,
harassed or tortured by the American government regardless of whether they are
ultimately charged and brought to trial? Or does the due process involuntary

of aliens are currently in jail after having been convicted of crimes in American courtrooms).
Permitting the government to force illegal aliens to testify at their own criminal trials would work a
fundamental change in the American trial process, creating a separate type of trial for non-Americans
where no constitutional rights are honored. And, although the Supreme Court has not directly ruled on
the applicability of the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination to non-Americans who
are located within the United States, it has ruled that they are entitled to equal protection rights, First
Amendment rights, just compensation rights under the Fifth Amendment, and certain due process rights
under the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments. For equal protection rights, see Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S.
202, 211-12 (1982) (holding that illegal aliens are protected by the Equal Protection Clause). See
generally Monroe Leigh, JudicialDecisions, 77 AM. J. INr'L L. 144, 151 (1983). For First Amendment
rights, see Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 148 (1945) (holding that aliens have First Amendment
rights). See generally Maryam Kamali Miyamoto, The First Amendment After Reno v. American-Arab
Anti-Discrimination Committee: A Different Bill of Rights for Aliens?, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 183
(2000) (discussing the application of the First Amendment to aliens). For just compensation rights
under the Fifth Amendment, see Russian Volunteer Fleet v. UnitedStates, 282 U.S. 481, 491-92 (1931).
For certain due process rights under the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments, see Wong Wing v. United
States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896) (holding that resident aliens are protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment and stating in dicta that they also are protected by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments); Yick
Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment protects resident
aliens).
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confession rule solely grant individuals a trial right-the right not to be convicted at trial through the use of a confession obtained through coercive means?
Is its prohibition on forceful and third-degree interrogation tactics simply
designed to keep the government from "stacking the deck" so that it may obtain
an unfair advantage at trial? Was it created to ensure a fair and reliable trial by
keeping out confessions that, because they may have been wrung out of
innocent defendants through the use of torture, are considered patently unreliable and likely to lead juries to convict innocent defendants?
1. The Due Process Involuntary Confession Rule Historically Was Interpreted
as Primarily Granting a Trial Right
The due process involuntary confession rule has been a chameleon, as it has
been interpreted to support different policies as it has evolved. 173 Undoubtedly,
when it was first introduced in the 1936 case of Brown v. Mississippi,174 it was
seen by the Court as a trial right. In that case, the defendants were convicted on
the basis of confessions that had been obtained through torture.' 75 In reversing
the convictions, the Court held that the "use of the confessions thus obtained as
the basis for conviction and sentence was a clear denial of due process."' 176 The
Court elaborated that "'[c]oercing the supposed state's criminals into confessions and using such confessions so coerced from them against them in trials
has been the curse of all countries. ' , 177 The due process violation in Brown
occurred at trial, not at the time of the interrogations, when the state authorities
"contrive[d] a conviction through the pretense of a trial, which in truth is 'but
used as a means of depriving a defendant of liberty through a deliberate
deception of court and jury by the presentation of [confessions] known to be
perjured"' and unreliable. 178 The Court reaffirmed this concept a few years later
in the 1941 case of Lisenba v. California,179 stating:
As applied to a criminal trial, denial of due process is the failure to observe
that fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of justice. In order to
declare a denial of it we must find that the absence of that fairness fatally
infected the trial; the acts complained of must be of such quality as necessarily prevents a fair trial. Such unfairness exists when a coerced confession is
used as a means of obtaining a verdict of guilt. We have so held in every
instance in which we have 80set aside for want of due process a conviction
based on such a confession.'

173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

See infra note 186 and accompanying text.
297 U.S. 278 (1936).
Id. at 286-87.
Id. at 286 (emphasis added).
Id. at 287 (emphasis added) (quoting Fisher v. State, 110 So. 361, 365 (Miss. 1926)).
Id. at 286 (quoting Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935)).
314 U.S. 219(1941).
Id. at 236-37.
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Through the ensuing decades, the Court's interpretation was consistent. In the
1945 case of Malinski v. New York,' 8' for example, the Court stated that it is the
"introduction of an involuntary confession" into evidence that violates the Due
Process Clause. 182 The Court further commented: "If all the attendant circumstances indicate that the confession was coerced or compelled, it may not be
used to convict a defendant. And if it is introduced at trial, the judgment" will
be reversed. 183 A decade later in Leyro v. Denno,18 4 the Court again instructed
that it is the "use in a state criminal trial of a defendant's confession obtained by
coercion" that is "forbidden" by the Due Process Clause. 18 5 The notion that it
was the "use" at trial of an involuntary confession that violates the Due Process
Clause was a direct result of the policies that were seen to underlie the
involuntary confession rule. Indeed, woven throughout the cases in this era was
a strong emphasis on trial-related policy concerns, including the need to ensure
the reliability of criminal trials, maintain186a sense of fairness in the criminal trial
process, and maintain judicial integrity.
Two cases decided during the "trial right era" deserve particular attention, as
87
they help set the parameters for the later discussion of Colorado v. Connelly'
in Part II.D.2 below.1 88 The first case, Blackburn v. Alabama, 189 involved a
181. 324 U.S. 401 (1945).
182. Id. at 404 (emphasis added).
183. Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
184. 347 U.S. 556 (1954).
185. Id. at 558.
186. As the due process involuntary confession rule has evolved, the Court has embraced a variety
of policies as supporting it, some of which are trial-related, and others of which arguably are not. See
Gardner, supra note 55, at 444-45 (discussing reliability and fairness); Joseph D. Grano, Voluntariness,
Free Will, and the Law of Confessions, 65 VA. L. REv. 859, 891-924 (1979) (discussing policies
underlying the due process involuntary confession rule, including reliability, fairness, a concern for
mental freedom, and deterrence of offensive police practices); Herman, supra note 59, at 750 (discussing reliability and deterring offensive police conduct); Herman, Part I, supra note 87, at 134, 150, 161,
187-88 (ensuring reliability protects interests of autonomy, privacy and dignity, because it protects
against convicting the innocent); Herman, Part II, supra note 39, at 515-16 (discussing dominance of
reliability policy, but also recognizing: 1) deterrence of offensive police conduct, 2) preference for
accusatorial rather than inquisitorial interrogation techniques, 3) protecting personal autonomy); Comment, supra note 40, at 314 (discussing reliability and the need to deter improper police practices); see
also Penney, supra note 64, at 313 (discussing the dominant role reliability has played in evolution of
the due process involuntary confession rule, and stating that through time the Court has embraced
different policies as underlying constitutional confession law in addition to reliability, including
preventing abusive interrogation techniques and protecting the right of suspects to make autonomous
decisions); Schulhofer, supra note 52, at 867-68 (discussing reliability, fairness, and a preference for an
accusatorial rather than inquisitorial system of justice as policies underlying involuntary confession
rule). Clearly the concern for reliable evidence and fairness in criminal trials are trial-related policies. It
is perhaps because these seem to be the primary concerns of the due process rule in this era that the
Court, even when recognizing other concerns such as the need to deter offensive police conduct, protect
personal autonomy, and preserve our accusatorial system of justice, continued to view the "use" of an
involuntary confession as the act that violates the Due Process Clause. See supra notes 174-85 and
accompanying text; infra notes 189-203 and accompanying text.
187. 479 U.S. 157 (1986).
188. See infra notes 208-51 and accompanying text.
189. 361 U.S. 199 (1960).

HeinOnline -- 91 Geo. L.J. 884 2002-2003

2003]

THE NEW FRONTIER OF CONSTITUTIONAL CONFESSION LAW

defendant, Blackburn, who was later found to be insane at the time of his
pretrial confession.' 90 Testimony in the record revealed that, although the
interrogating officer knew that Blackburn had been a patient in a mental
hospital in the past, Blackburn had appeared "clear-eyed" and "sensible" during
his interrogation.' 9 ' The interrogation was conducted in a small room, over a
period of eight or nine hours, with as many as three officers in the room at any
given time. 192 No threats had been made to Blackburn to obtain his confession,
and no torture or "rack and screw" interrogation techniques were employed. In
reversing Blackburn's conviction, the Court elaborated on the policies behind
the due process involuntary confession rule, which center primarily on the need
to maintain the fairness and integrity of trials and our criminal justice system
generally by prohibiting the use or introduction of involuntary confessions:
It is ... established that the Fourteenth Amendment forbids fundamental
unfairness in the use of evidence whether true or false. Consequently, we have
rejected the argument that introduction of an involuntary confession is immaterial where other evidence establishes guilt or corroborates the confession. As
important as it is that persons who have committed crimes be convicted, there
are considerations which transcend the question of guilt or innocence. Thus,
in cases involving involuntary confessions, this Court enforces the strongly
felt attitude of our society that important human values are sacrificed where
an agency of the government, in the course of securing a conviction, wrings a
confession out of an accused against his will. This insistence upon putting the
government to the task of proving guilt by means other than inquisition was
engendered by historical abuses which are quite familiar.
But neither the likelihood that the confession is untrue nor the preservation
of the individual's freedom of will is the sole interest at stake. As we said just
last term, the abhorrence of society to the use of involuntary confessions ...
also turns on the deep-rooted feeling that the police must obey the law while
enforcing the law; that in the end life and liberty can be as much endangered
those thought to be criminals as from the
from illegal methods used to 9convict
3
actual criminals themselves. 1
The Court then set forth its specific rationale for reversing Blackburn's conviction, focusing primarily on the fact that the use of a confession at trial that was
made involuntarily due to mental illness offends the fair trial and judicial
integrity policies underpinning the due process involuntary confession rule:
In the case at bar, the evidence indisputably establishes the strongest probability that Blackburn was insane and incompetent at the time he allegedly
confessed. Surely in the present stage of our civilization a most basic sense of

190.
191.
192.
193.

Id. at 200-05.
Id. at 204.
Id.
Id. at 206-07 (citations and internal quotations omitted).
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justice is affronted by the spectacle of incarcerating a human being upon the
basis of a statement he made while insane; and this judgment can without
difficulty be articulated in terms of the unreliability of the confession, the lack
of rational choice of the accused, or simply a strong conviction that our
system of law enforcement should not operate so as to take advantage of a
person in this fashion. And when the other pertinent circumstances are
considered-the eight- to nine-hour sustained interrogation in a tiny room
which was upon occasion literally filled with police officers; the absence of
Blackburn's friends, relatives, or legal counsel; the composition of the confession by the Deputy Sheriff rather than by Blackburn-the chances of the
confession's having been the product of a rational intellect and a free will
become94even more remote and the denial of due process even more egregious. 1
The second case, Townsend v. Sain, 195 involved a defendant, Townsend, who
was questioned by the police while under the influence of the drug hyoscine,
which was alleged by the defendant to be a truth serum.1 96 The drug had been
given to Townsend to alleviate severe symptoms he was experiencing at the
time of the interrogation caused by heroin withdrawal. 97 The police officers
who questioned Townsend claimed that they were unaware at the time of
hyoscine's properties as a truth serum.' 9 8 Townsend argued that, even though
his confession was a product of the truth serum and not of any improper
physical coercion by the police, his confession should have been suppressed
pursuant to the due process involuntary confession rule.' 99 The Supreme Court
agreed. In remanding the case for further proceedings, the Court ruled that the
Due Process Clause mandates the exclusion of an involuntary confession regardless of whether that confession was caused by "physical intimidation or psychological pressure" by the police or by an external source such as a truth serum,
stating:
It is difficult to imagine a situation in which a confession would be less the
product of a free intellect, less voluntary, than when brought about by a drug
having the effect of a truth serum. It is not significant that the drug may have
been administered and the questions asked by persons unfamiliar with hyoscine's properties as a truth serum, if these properties exist. Any questioning
by police officers which in fact produces a confession which is not the
product of a free intellect renders that confession inadmissible. The Court has
usually so stated the test: If the confession which petitioner made ... was in
fact involuntary, the conviction cannot stand ....

And in Blackburn v. Ala-

194. Id. at 207-08.

195. 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
196. Id. at 298.

197. Id.
198. Id. at 299.
199. Id. at 304-05.
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bama, we held irrelevant the absence of evidence of improper purpose on the
part of the questioning officers. There the evidence indicated that the interrogating officers thought the defendant sane when he confessed, but we judged the
because the probability was that the defendant was in
confession inadmissible
2
fact insane at the time. 00

Blackburn and Townsend demonstrate the Court's view during this era that it
was not the employment of coercive interrogation techniques by itself--devoid
of any use at trial of the resulting confession-that violated the Due Process
Clause. Rather, the violation occurred when a criminal trial was infected by the
introduction of a tainted, coerced confession.20 ' Indeed, as late as 1978 in
Mincey v. Arizona, 0 2 the Supreme Court continued to view the due process
involuntary confession rule primarily as granting a trial right when it stated that
the "use" of an involuntary confession at trial merely for impeachment purposes-even when there is overwhelming other evidence of the defendant's
guilt-tarnishes the proceedings in such a way as to violate the Due Process
Clause.

°3

If one were to have asked in 1978 whether the due process involuntary
confession rule would apply to the Italian defendant in the preceding hypothetical, the answer would have been in the affirmative. 0 Because the involuntary
200. Id. at 307-09 (citations, footnotes and internal quotations omitted).
201. See Benner, supra note 51, at 128-35 (discussing cases in which courts found that, even in
absence of police misconduct, due process was violated when confession was obtained from defendant
whose capacity for self determination was substantially impaired); Schulhofer, supra note 52, at 867
(stating that the "admission" of an involuntary confession during this era violated due process).
202. 437 U.S. 385 (1973).
203. Id. at 398. During this era, language occasionally appeared in Supreme Court cases that
arguably suggested, at first glance, that the due process violation was seen to occur at the time of the
interrogation rather than at trial. For example, in Rodgers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534,(1961), the Court
stated that when an involuntary confession has been admitted into evidence, the defendant's conviction
must be reversed despite the fact that there was overwhelming evidence, other than the involuntary
confession, establishing his guilt. Id. at 541. The Court went on to state: "Despite such verification,
confessions were found to be the product of constitutionally impermissible methods in their inducement." Id. (emphasis added). The Court then stated, however, that "[slince a defendant had been
subjected to pressures to which, under our accusatorial system, an accused should not be subjected, we
are constrained to find that the procedures leading to his conviction had failed to afford him that due
process of law which the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees." Id. (emphasis added). This clarification
suggests that it was the trial, rather than the interrogation, that violated the Due Process Clause.
204. Although not on point, in 1974 the Second Circuit ruled in United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d
267 (1974), that the Due Process Clause requires a court to divest itself of jurisdiction when a
non-American defendant has been brought to the United States for trial by American officials through
the use of illegal, offensive means. In Toscanino, the defendant had been kidnapped in Uruguay by
American agents, and "abducted ... to the United States" for purposes of prosecution. Id. at 268. The
agents had allegedly tortured the defendant en route. Id. Because the constitutional violation in
Toscanino can be seen as occurring both in Uruguay and in the United States as the agents transported
him back to their jurisdiction for prosecution, it is not clear in this case whether the court held that the
Due Process Clause protects non-Americans beyond the borders of the United States. In addition, the
Toscanino Court viewed the due process violation as falling under the "shocks the conscience" doctrine
of Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), rather than the involuntary confession rule. Toscanino,
500 F.2d at 274. See infra note 205 and accompanying text; see also Iraola, supra note 1, at 7-8 (noting
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confession rule was seen as granting a trial right that is violated when an
involuntary confession is introduced at trial, any violation of the Due Process
Clause would have happened at trial in the United States when the involuntary
confession was introduced, and not at the time of the pretrial interrogation in
Italy.20 5 Accordingly, the reasoning in the Mathews v. Diaz line of cases would
the Italian defendant at his trial in the United
have controlled the matter, 206 and th
States would have 20successfully
suppressed
the involuntary confession extracted
7
Italy.
in
FBI
by the
that several circuits have adopted Second Circuit's approach in Toscanino, while others have rejected
it).
205. The Due Process Clause has spawned numerous doctrines in addition to the involuntary
confession rule. The Rochin rule, for example, holds inadmissible evidence obtained through police
conduct so egregious that it "shocks the conscience." Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172. This doctrine is distinct
from the involuntary confession rule. The Rochin decision is unclear as to whether this doctrine grants a
trial right or a freestanding civil liberty. Compare id. (indicating that conduct that shocks the conscience
violates due process) with id. at 174 (indicating that it is the use of such evidence to obtain a conviction
that violates due process). Whether or not this doctrine might, during this era, have applied to exclude
evidence obtained abroad through egregious means is beyond the scope of this Article.
206. See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
207. A handful of cases in this era purport at first glance to address the issue, but a closer
examination reveals that they are not on point. For example, in Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532
(1897), the defendant, a crewman on an American vessel, allegedly committed a murder upon the high
seas and was interrogated by Canadian police when his ship arrived in Halifax, Nova Scotia. Id. at 537.
The defendant made incriminating statements to the Canadian officers during the interrogation, and was
eventually transported back to Massachusetts to stand trial for murder. Id. The United States Supreme
Court reversed his conviction on the ground that the defendant had made the incriminating statements
involuntarily as a result of pressure applied by the Canadian police. Id. at 562-65. The Court did not
discuss the extraterritorial application of the privilege against self-incrimination in the decision, but
simply analyzed the facts of the case as if it were assumed that the privilege applies in Canada where
the interrogation took place. Because the defendant in that case was an American citizen, however, and
because the decision addressed the applicability of the privilege rather than the due process involuntary
confession rule, Brain provides no guidance in determining the application of the due process rule to
non-Americans interrogated abroad.
In United States v. Welch, 455 F.2d 211 (2d Cir. 1972), the defendant was arrested by the Bahamian
police at a bank in the Bahamas where he was attempting to deposit a United States treasury bill that
had been stolen from a bank in New York City. Id. at 212. After being taken to police headquarters, the
defendant made incriminating statements to the Bahamian police without first having been advised of
his complete Miranda rights. Id. at 212-13. After being brought to the United States for trial, the
defendant moved to suppress those statements pursuant to Miranda. Id. at 212. In upholding the district
court's denial of the defendant's motion to suppress, the Second Circuit ruled that "since the Miranda
requirements were primarily designed to prevent United States police officers from relying upon
improper interrogation techniques and as the requirements have little, if any, deterrent effect upon
foreign police officers, the Miranda warnings should not serve as the sine qua non of admissibility." Id.
at 213. Because Miranda's exclusionary rule was designed to deter American police officers from
ignoring the dictates of that decision, applying the rule to the Bahamian police-who may not be aware
of the Miranda decision and who are not bound by American law-would have little additional impact
in protecting the privilege. The Welch decision was in accord with a line of cases from various circuits
holding that Miranda does not apply to interrogations abroad that are conducted by foreign-as
opposed to American-law enforcement officials. See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, U.S. Law Enforcement
Abroad: The Constitution and International Law, Continued, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 444, 454-55 (1990)
(discussing the line of cases holding that Miranda does not apply to interrogations conducted by foreign
police). Having dispensed with Miranda, the Welch court then went on to note, without significant
discussion, that the defendant's confession was voluntary and thus the admission of his confession at
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2. The Supreme Court's Decision in Colorado v. Connelly Recast the Due
Process Involuntary Confession Rule as a Freestanding Civil Liberty
In the 1986 case of Colorado v. Connelly,20 8 the Court fundamentally altered
the nature of the due process involuntary confession rule and reinvented the
doctrine as a freestanding civil liberty. In that case, the defendant, Connelly,
walked up to a police officer on the street and "stated that he had murdered
someone and wanted to talk about it."' 20 9 The police officer advised Connelly of
his Miranda rights, which Connelly promptly waived. 2 0 The officer then asked
Connelly a few questions, Connelly's replies to which revealed he had been a
patient in several mental hospitals. 2 ' A second officer arrived on the scene and
asked Connelly "what he had on his mind. 21 2 Connelly then confessed in detail
to a murder.2 13 Prior to trial, Connelly moved to suppress the confession under
Blackburn and Townsend on the ground that his confession was involuntary.2 4
In support of his motion, a psychiatrist testified at the pretrial suppression
hearing that, due to chronic schizophrenia, Connelly was in a psychotic state at
the time of his confession and was following the "voice of God."' 2 5 This voice

trial was not unconstitutional. 455 F.2d at 213. By applying the involuntary confession rule to the facts
of that case, the Welch court suggested-or, more correctly, assumed for argument's sake-that the
involuntary confession rule applies abroad.
Similarly, both the Fifth Circuit in Kilday v.United States, 481 F.2d 655 (5th Cir. 1973), and the
Ninth Circuit in Brulay v. United States, 383 F.2d 345 (9th Cir. 1967), concluded, like the Second
Circuit in Welch, that Miranda's exclusionary rule does not apply to interrogations conducted by
foreign police, and noted in dicta that the confessions in those cases were voluntary and thus were
admissible. Kilday, 481 F.2d at 655-56; Brulay, 383 F.2d at 348. However, Welch, Brulay, and Kilday
hardly can be said to constitute definitive rulings on the applicability of the due process involuntary
confession rule to non-Americans abroad. First, the defendant in Brulay was an American citizen. 383
F.2d at 349. The other two decisions did not even mention the nationality of their respective defendants.
Given the facts of Kilday and Welch, in which significant parts of the crimes in question occurred in the
United States, it is quite possible that those courts did not address the citizenship issue because the
defendants in each case were Americans. Kilday, 481 F.2d at 655; Welch, 455 F.2d at 212. In none of
the aforementioned cases was there any credible suggestion that the confessions were involuntary, and
therefore these courts simply mentioned in passing that the involuntary confession rule would not
provide an additional basis for relief. In addition, it was not clear whether these cases were analyzing
the issue under the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination or the due process standard.
However, all three cases cited Bram in their discussion, which suggests that they were applying the
privilege against self-incrimination rather than the due process involuntary confession rule. As set forth
infra at notes 253-57 and accompanying text, the privilege would apply in such a situation, so the lack
of clarity in these cases renders them unhelpful to the issue at hand. Furthermore, these cases did not
directly address the issue or offer a level of analysis suggesting that the courts were ruling squarely on
the tricky issue of the extraterritorial application of the due process involuntary confession rule to
non-Americans abroad.
208. 479 U.S. 157 (1986).
209. Id. at 160.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 161, 164.
215. Id. at 161.
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demanded that he either confess to the killing or commit suicide. 2 , 6 Connelly
had "reluctantly" followed the voice in confessing to the police officers.21 7
The trial court, state appellate court and then the Supreme Court of Colorado
all agreed that Connelly's involuntary confession had to be suppressed. 2 8
Based on a straightforward reading of Townsend and Blackburn, the Colorado
courts ruled that the introduction into evidence of such a patently unreliable
involuntary confession would taint the trial and constitute the requisite "state
action" that would violate the Due Process Clause.21 9
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court did not dispute that Connelly's confession had been made involuntarily or that his confession was unreliable. 220 The
Court nonetheless reversed and remanded the case for trial, holding that the
introduction into evidence of Connelly's involuntary confession on remand
would not violate the Due Process Clause.22 ' What is particularly striking about
the Connelly decision is how the Court described the policy underlying the due
process involuntary confession rule and the "triggering act" that violates the
Due Process Clause. With respect to policy, the Court relieved the involuntary
confession rule of its previous role of protecting against admission of unreliable
and unfair evidence at trials, stating simply: "A [confession] rendered by one in
the condition of [Connelly] might be proved to be quite unreliable, but this is a
matter to be governed by the evidentiary laws of [the state of Colorado], and not
by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."2 22 This holding is
directly at odds with a long line of the Court's due process confession cases, all
of which had repeatedly admonished that one of the primary functions of the
involuntary confession rule is to protect against the admission of unreliable
2 23
confessions.
But the Connelly Court went even further. It not only eviscerated the trialrelated policy rationale on which the due process voluntariness rule had been
grounded for fifty years, but it also expressly refocused the rule as being aimed
instead at preventing abuses by the police in the pretrial interrogation context.
The Court asserted that the purpose of the Due Process Clause in relation to
confessions is to prohibit "'certain interrogation techniques ...

[that are] so

offensive to a civilized system of justice that they must be condemned.' 224 The
Court then characterized its previous fifty years of due process confession cases
as having been primarily concerned with controlling "coercive police conduct"

216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 162.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 164-67.
221. Id. at 167.
222. id. (citations omitted).
223. See supra note 186 and accompanying text; see also Herman, Part H, supra note 39, at 517
(discussing how the Connelly decision was at odds with prior case law).
224. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 163 (quoting Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 109 (1985)).
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during interrogations.225 For example, the Court insisted that the original due
process confession case, Brown v. Mississippi, and all the due process cases that
followed, "focused on the crucial element of police overreaching. ' 2 6 This
statement is, of course, disingenuous because the pre-Connelly Court viewed
the Due Process Clause as being concerned primarily with the "use" of involuntary confessions at trial because of the corrupting effect they have on the
integrity of the trial process.2 27
Taking its departure from precedent one step further, the Connelly Court
suggested that involuntary confessions are excluded from evidence not because
the act of admitting such confessions violates due process, but rather because
the exclusionary rule associated with the voluntariness requirement is a judiciallycreated punitive measure to deter police officers from engaging in "coercive
police activity" in future cases.2 28 In so stating, the Court necessarily characterized "coercive police activity" as the "real" due process violation-the act that
triggers (and violates) the due process involuntary confession rule.2 29
A few statements by the Court in this respect are particularly instructive. For
instance, the Court stated: "[S]uppressing [Connelly's] statements would serve
absolutely no purpose in enforcing constitutional guarantees. The purpose of
excluding evidence seized in violation of the Constitution is to substantially
deter future violations of the Constitution., 230 This assertion reflects a belief
that the "constitutional guarantee" granted by the due process involuntary
confession rule is not the right to exclude involuntary confessions at trial, but
rather the right to be free from police coercion generally. Involuntary confessions are excluded so that other suspects in the future will not be subjected to
the "true" constitutional concern-police coercion. The use of the word "future"
in the statement above further reflects an understanding that the due process
voluntariness rule is violated not at trial, but in the pretrial interrogation stage
when the "coercive police activity" takes place.
Also enlightening is the fact that the Court cited its decision in United States
v. Leon23 1 for its discussion of the exclusionary rule associated with the due
process voluntariness rule.2 32 Leon made clear that evidence seized in violation
of the Fourth Amendment is excluded pursuant to a judicially created rule, and
not because the Constitution requires it. 23 3 Thus, Leon helped establish the
Fourth Amendment as a freestanding civil liberty. The Court's linkage of the

225. Id. at 163-64.
226. Id. at 163.
227. See supra note 186 and accompanying text; see also Benner, supra note 51, at 142 (arguing that
Connelly "obliterated" the reliability rationale).
228. 479 U.S. at 166-67.
229. See id. at 167.
230. Id. at 166 (emphasis added).
231. 468 U.S. 897.
232. Id.
233. See supra notes 167-68 and accompanying text.
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due process involuntary confession rule to the Fourth Amendment in this
respect is significant.
Given Connelly's shift in policy focus from the trial stage to the pretrial
interrogation context, and its linkage of the due process exclusionary rule to the
Fourth Amendment and Leon, it is not surprising that the Connelly Court held
that the "use" of an involuntary confession, by itself, does not violate the Due
Process Clause.2 34 Indeed, the lower courts in Colorado had all found the
requisite "state action" triggering the Due Process Clause to be the prosecutor's
"use" of Connelly's involuntary confession. 3 5 This view was consistent with
the Court's earlier due process jurisprudence, particularly Blackburn and
Townsend, which together had stood for the proposition that even where there is
no improper police conduct, the introduction of a confession that is involuntary
for any reason-whether because of a "truth serum" or mental illness-violates
the due process involuntary confession rule.236 Consistent with its newfound
interpretation of the rule as serving a pretrial rather than a trial function,
however, the Connelly Court expressly rejected the idea that the mere "use" of
an involuntary confession at trial constitutes the requisite state action that
triggers and violates the Due Process Clause. 37
Since Connelly the due process involuntary confession rule functions, like the
Fourth Amendment, to prevent abuses by the police at the pretrial investigation
stage regardless of the setting. It no longer functions, like the privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination, only in the trial setting by blocking the introduction of unreliable, coerced confessions. After Connelly, therefore, involuntary
confessions are excluded from evidence not because the Constitution requires it,
but because, as with evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment, a
judicially created rule designed to deter police officers from committing future
constitutional violations requires it. After Connelly, the "use" of an involuntary
confession at trial does not violate the Constitution, just as the "use" of
evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment does not violate the
Constitution. Finally, after Connelly, a violation of the due process involuntary
confession rule is "fully accomplished" at the time of the unlawful interrogation, just as violations of the Fourth Amendment are fully accomplished at the
time of the unlawful search or seizure. In other words, the Court in Connelly
converted the due process involuntary confession rule from a trial right to a
238
freestanding civil liberty.

234. 479 U.S. at 167.
235. Id. at 162.
236. See supra notes 189-201 and accompanying text.
237. See Benner, supra note 51, at 126, 136 (noting that Connelly "charted a new course in a
direction 180 degrees" from prior case law in holding that the admission of an involuntary confession
does not violate due process); Herman, Part 1I, supra note 39, at 508 (noting that after Connelly, due
process is not violated merely by the "prosecution's use of a statement in evidence against the maker").
238. The Supreme Court further eroded the notion that the mere "use" of an involuntary confession
violates the Due Process Clause in Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991) (plurality decision),
when it held that the introduction of an involuntary confession does not require a reversal if the error
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Although no court has yet directly addressed the effect of Connelly on the
extraterritorial application of the due process involuntary confession rule,23 9
Connelly's impact has been recognized by several lower federal courts in the
related area of civil liability of the police for unlawful interrogations. Cases
occasionally arise in which the police coerce a confession from a suspect, but
then decline to bring charges against that suspect. This occurs in some cases
because the police eventually realize they had initially targeted the wrong
suspect and obtained a confession from him only because they applied undue
pressure during the interrogation. The suspect then files a civil suit citing the

was harmless in light of the other evidence at trial. Id. at 306-12. One could argue that certain language
in the Court's opinion suggests that the due process involuntary confession rule is a trial right. Indeed,
the Court referred to the admission of an involuntary confession as a "trial error." Id. at 309. Labeling
the introduction of an involuntary confession as a "trial error," however, cannot be seen as equivalent to
categorizing the due process involuntary confession rule as a "trial right," particularly because the
Court in Fulminante categorized the introduction of evidence seized in violation of the Fourth
Amendment as a "trial error" as well. Id. at 310. However, the law is very clear that the Fourth
Amendment is not a trial right. See supra notes 158-68 and accompanying text. In addition, the dissent
in Fulminante attacked the majority and its adoption of the harmless error analysis for having overruled
a long line of precedent establishing that "'the admission in evidence ... of [a] coerced confession
vitiates the judgment because it violates the Due Process Clause."' Id. at 288-89 (emphasis added)
(quoting Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 568 (1958)).
239. See United States v. Wolf, 813 F.2d 970, 972 n.3 (9th Cir. 1987) (recognizing that Connelly
undermines the extraterritorial application of American confession law to non-Americans, but expressly
declining to decide the issue because the confession in that case was found to be voluntary regardless of
the applicability of the Bill of Rights). In United States v. Fernandez-Caro,677 F. Supp. 893 (S.D. Tex.
1987), the court suppressed evidence that was the "fruit" of a confession that had been extracted from
the defendant in Mexico by Mexican law enforcement agents through the use of torture. Id. at 895. The
court ruled that the defendant, who was not an American citizen, could claim the protection of the due
process "shocks the conscience" doctrine. Id. However, Fernandez-Carois not relevant to the issue at
hand because it was decided under Rochin rather than the due process involuntary confession rule. See
supra note 205 (discussing Rochin doctrine). That the court avoided determining the extraterritorial
application of the involuntary confession rule is telling. Moreover, although the court in FernandezCaro cited several cases for the proposition that the Rochin doctrine applies to non-Americans abroad,
id. at 895, a close examination of these cases should, in fact, lead one to the opposite conclusion. The
Fernandez-Carocourt cited United States v. Morrow, 537 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1976), United States v.
Heller, 625 F.2d 594 (5th Cir. 1980), and United States v. Hawkins, 661 F.2d 436 (5th Cir. 1981) as its
authority for this proposition. 677 F. Supp. at 894-95. Both Heller and Hawkins stated in dicta that a
court has the power to exclude evidence seized abroad in a method that "shocks the conscience," and
both courts relied on Morrow for this proposition. Heller, 625 F.2d at 599 (citing Morrow); Hawkins,
661 E2d at 456 (same). Neither Heller nor Hawkins indicated on what ground such evidence may be
excluded. Heller, 625 F.2d at 599 (remaining silent as to legal ground for exclusion); Hawkins, 661 F.2d
at 456 (same). However, the Morrow decision, on which Fernandez-Carowas purportedly based, held
that a federal court has the authority to exclude evidence seized abroad by means that "shock the
conscience" not under the Due Process Clause, but under the "supervisory powers" of the federal
courts. Morrow, 537 F.2d at 139. When a court excludes evidence pursuant to its supervisory powers, it
does so only when the Constitution does not apply, and it therefore creates an exclusionary rule for that
purpose similar to a common law rule of evidence. See generally United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727
(1980) (discussing supervisory powers of the federal courts). The Morrow court thus eschewed the
applicability of the Due Process Clause in this context, and the district court's holding in FernandezCaro was, therefore, contrary to the law of its own circuit. For a discussion of other cases that purport
to address the applicability of the due process involuntary confession rule to non-Americans abroad, see
supra note 207.
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rule in Bivens 240 or under Title 42, United States Code, Section 1983,241
alleging that the police violated his constitutional right under the due process
involuntary confession rule to be free from coercive police activity. These cases
require a court to make the same finding required when determining the
extraterritorial application of the rule to non-Americans: whether a violation of
the rule is "fully accomplished" at the time of the interrogation or whether the
violation occurs later when the confession is introduced into evidence. If the
violation occurs at the time of trial and not at the time of the interrogation, then
the civil suits of these plaintiffs must fail-no constitutional deprivation took
place against them because they were never charged and tried.
Analyzing the policies behind the rule, several lower courts have held that a
violation of the due process involuntary confession rule is fully accomplished at
the time of the coercive interrogation, and that, as with the Fourth Amendment,
involuntary confessions are excluded as a deterrent measure pursuant to a rule
of judicial-rather than constitutional-origin. For example, in Weaver v. Brenner,242 the Second Circuit held that civil damages could be awarded even where
there had been no "use" of an involuntary confession, because "the constitutional violation [of the due process involuntary confession rule] is complete
when the offending behavior occurs, and the refusal to admit at trial statements
made as a result of coercion is merely a corrective way in which a court
penalizes conduct that violates the Constitution.,, 243 Similarly, in Cooper v.
Dupnik the Ninth Circuit ruled that the "due process violation caused by
coercive behavior of law-enforcement officers in pursuit of a confession is
complete with the coercive behavior itself. . . . All a court does in a judicial
context is apply the corrective where due process already has been denied. '2 44

240. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397
(1971) (holding that citizens may sue federal officials for monetary damages in relation to constitutional deprivation). For an overview of Bivens suits, see generally Gene R. Nichol, Bivens, Chilicky,
and Constitutional Damages Claims, 75 VA. L. REV. 1117, 1118-20 (1989).
241. The relevant portion of Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ....
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). For an overview of Section 1983 suits, see Thomas E.L. Dewey, Prisoners'
Rights: ProceduralMeans of Enforcement Under Section 1983, 79 GEO. L.J. 1253, 1281-94 (1991).
242. 40 F.3d 527, 536 (2d Cir. 1994).
243. Id.
244. Cooper v. Dupnik, 963 F.2d 1220, 1244-45 (9th Cir. 1992). References to the "use" or
"introduction" of an involuntary confession as the triggering act that violates the Due Process Clause
can still be seen in judicial decisions from time to time. See, e.g., Ledbetter v. Edwards, 35 F.3d 1062,
1067 (6th Cir. 1994) (due process prohibits the "admission" of an involuntary confession); United
States v. Tatum, 121 F. Supp. 2d 577, 580 (E.D. Tex. 2000) (the "use" of a coerced statement violates
due process). However, in none of these cases is the court actually addressing the temporal issue of
when the Due Process Clause is violated. Indeed, such statements are typically made in passing when
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The Supreme Court's recent decision in Chavez v. Martinez2 45 seems to
support the position taken by the Second Circuit in Weaver and the Ninth
Circuit in Cooper. As stated supra, Chavez involved a Section 1983 suit for
monetary damages against a police sergeant where the statements elicited by the
sergeant through coercion were never used against the suspect in a criminal
trial. 4 6 The suspect, Martinez, brought suit under both the privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination and the Due Process Clause. While the Court
rejected Martinez' claims under the privilege against compulsory selfincrimination, holding that the privilege is a trial right,24 7 a majority of the
Court differentiated Martinez' claim based on the Due Process Clause.2 48
Indeed, in a section of his opinion that consisted of a single sentence, Justice
Souter, writing for the Court on this issue, remanded the case for Martinez to
pursue his due process claim.2 49 The Court left it to the lower courts to
determine "the scope and merits of any such [due process] action that may be
found open to [Martinez]" based on the coercive interrogation.2 5 0 Thus, while
certainly not dispositive of the issue, the distinction made by the Court in
Chavez tends to support the notion that the due process involuntary confession
rule is a freestanding civil liberty, and that a violation of the rule is fully
accomplished at the time of the coercive interrogation.
These courts are correct that, after Connelly, the due process involuntary
confession rule mirrors the Fourth Amendment and that a violation of the rule is
fully accomplished at the time of the coercive interrogation. Accordingly, if one
were to ask post-Connelly whether the Italian suspect in the previously posed
hypothetical could suppress his involuntary confession at trial in the United
States, the answer would be no. Because the due process violation in his case
was "fully accomplished" in Italy and no separate constitutional deprivation
occurred by the mere introduction of his involuntary confession at trial, his
motion to suppress on due process grounds would not be successful under
Verdugo- Urquidez.2 5'
E. THE DEFAULT TEST FOR NON-AMERICANS ABROAD IS THE PROHIBITION OF
"COMPELLED" CONFESSIONS CONTAINED IN THE PRIVILEGE
AGAINST COMPULSORY SELF-INCRIMINATION

As previously explored in detail, there is a two-step process for the admissibility of confessions within the territorial boundaries of the United States. 252 I
quoting boilerplate standards from older Supreme Court cases, and thus should be interpreted as mere
dicta. Ledbetter, 35 F3d at 1067; Tatum, 121 F. Supp. 2d at 580.
245. 123 S.Ct. 1994 (2003).
246. See supra notes 152-55 and accompanying text.
247. See supra notes 156-57 and accompanying text.
248. 123 S.Ct. at 2008.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264-74 (1990).
252. See supra notes 82-91 and accompanying text.
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have asserted in a previous article that the first step, the Miranda doctrine, does
not strictly apply to non-Americans abroad.2 53 As demonstrated, the second step
or default rule in the United States-the due process involuntary confession
rule-also does not apply to non-Americans abroad. 4 But within the United
States a third confession rule has lurked in the background, overshadowed by
the due process involuntary confession rule, remaining largely unexplored and
undefined.2 55 This rule is the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. 5 6
Stated simply, the privilege and its ban on "compelled" confessions applies to
non-Americans abroad. The Italian suspect in the hypothetical would not be
successful in suppressing his coerced confession on the grounds that he was not
Mirandized, or that his confession was involuntary in violation of the due
process involuntary confession rule. But his argument that introduction of
the confession would violate the privilege would be meritorious because the
privilege is a "trial right," the violation of which takes place within the
United States when a "compelled" confession is introduced.25 7 Although
Connelly converted the due process involuntary confession rule from a trial
right to a freestanding civil liberty, the privilege's position as a trial right
has remained intact, and is unlikely to change in the future. 2 58 Unfortunately, the Court's preference for the due process involuntary confession
rule through the years has shielded the privilege from being examined
thoroughly in the interrogation context, and no clear definition of a "compelled" confession exists at this time. Part III looks at the origins, text,
policies and precedents relating to the privilege in an attempt to shed light
on the precise meaning of "compulsion."

253. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
254. See supra notes 208-51 and accompanying text.
255. See supra notes 73-91 and accompanying text.
256. See supra notes 73-91 and accompanying text.
257. See supra notes 135-57 and accompanying text.
258. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 170 (1986); see supra note 149. See also supra notes
151-57 and accompanying text. Although I believe it is unlikely to occur, the Court's decision in
Chavez v. Martinez, 123 S.Ct. 1994 (2003), arguably leaves room for the Court to modify its
position on this issue in the future. Indeed, the Court's holding in Chavez that the privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination is a trial right was a plurality decision. Justice Thomas, joined by
three other Justices, made clear that, in his view, the privilege is violated only at trial when a
coerced statement is introduced into evidence. Chavez, 123 S.Ct. at 1999-2004. Justice Souter,
however, wrote a concurring opinion, joined by one other Justice, which was not quite as decisive
on this issue. Indeed, Souter wrote that at its "core," the privilege against compulsory selfincrimination is a trial right. Id. at 2006-08 (Souter, J., concurring). Souter added, however, that if
a defendant/petitioner could make a "powerful showing" that it is necessary in a given case to
extend the privilege against self-incrimination beyond its core in order to protect the basic right,
the Court could do so. Id. at 2007. Souter believed that Martinez had failed to make such a
powerful showing under the facts and circumstances of that case. Based on this analysis, it is
conceivable that, if faced with the issue in the future, Justice Souter would extend the privilege to
cover an interrogation of a non-American abroad, if he felt that such an extension was necessary to
protect the core right.
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WHAT IS A "COMPELLED CONFESSION"?: THE "OBJECTIVELY IDENTIFIABLE
PENALTY" TEST

Although the Court has not given clear guidance on the meaning of "compulsion" in the police interrogation context, it has defined this term clearly in the
context of formal proceedings, such as trials or Congressional hearings. Section
A explores the cases in this area, which stand for the principle that any
government conduct that imposes "objectively identifiable penalties" on the
refusal to speak, or to provoke statements, constitutes compulsion in violation
of the privilege. Section B posits that any formulation of the term "compulsion"
in the interrogation context must be informed by this standard. This Section
therefore proposes the "objectively identifiable penalty" test as the test for
compulsion in the police interrogation context. The Section then critiques
alternative tests offered to date by other scholars. This analysis demonstrates
that, in contrast to tests proposed by other scholars, the "objectively identifiable
penalty" test is consistent with both the text and history of the privilege. In
addition, the "objectively identifiable penalty" test proposed herein is the only
test proposed thus far that is consistent with current Supreme Court precedent.
Section c then discusses how the "objectively identifiable penalty" test would
operate in the police interrogation context. The Article concludes by asserting
that this test should be used to determine the admissibility in American courts of
confessions taken by the FBI from non-Americans abroad.
A. THE SUPREME COURT HAS INTERPRETED THE PRIVILEGE IN THE FORMAL SETTING AS
REQUIRING AN OBJECTIVE TEST THAT PROHIBITS THE GOVERNMENT'S IMPOSITION OF
"PENALTIES" IN RESPONSE TO SILENCE OR TO PROVOKE SPEECH

The Supreme Court has created a clear and well-developed jurisprudence
regarding the meaning of "compulsion" in formal proceedings such as trials. In
2 59 for example, the defendant was charged with murder in
Griffin v. California,
2 60
the first degree.
At his trial, the defendant invoked his right under the
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination not to testify in his own defense.2 6 In closing arguments to the jury, the prosecutor commented on the
defendant's failure to speak on his own behalf, and asserted to the jury that it
should draw an adverse inference against him for that reason.262 The judge
likewise instructed the jury that the defendant had a constitutional ight not to
testify, but it was free to draw an unfavorable inference from his failure to do
SO. 2 6 3 The jury convicted.2 4

On appeal, the Supreme Court held that both the prosecutor's comment and

259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.

380 U.S. 609 (1965).
Id. at 609.
Id.
Id. at 610-11.
Id. at 610.
Id. at 609.
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the trial judge's instructions to the jury constituted "compulsion" in violation of
the privilege.2 65 The Court reasoned that these acts imposed a "penalty" on the
defendant for remaining silent.2 66 The prosecutor's and trial judge's comments
were considered penalties because they arguably increased the chances of a
conviction. In this respect, the Court stated:
[The] comment on the refusal to testify ... is a penalty imposed by the courts
for exercising a constitutional privilege, which the Fifth Amendment outlaws.
It cuts down on the privilege by making its assertion costly. It is said,
however, that the inference of guilt for failure to testify as to facts peculiarly
within the accused's knowledge is in any event natural and irresistible, and
that comment on the failure does not magnify that inference into a penalty for
asserting a constitutional privilege. What the jury may infer, given no help
from the court, is one thing. What it may infer when the court solemnizes the
silence of the accused into evidence against him is quite another.2 67
In Gardnerv. Broderick,26 8 a police officer was fired by the state for refusing
to testify before a grand jury investigating corruption in his department. The

Court held that this termination violated the privilege because it imposed a
"penalty of the loss of employment. 26 9 Similarly, in Garrity v. New Jersey,2 7
several police officers made self-incriminating statements at a state ticket-fixing

inquiry. 27 Their statements were later used against them when they were
prosecuted for participating in a conspiracy to cover up the ticket-fixing
scheme.2 72 Prior to testifying at the inquiry the officers had been told that,

pursuant to a New Jersey statute,27 3 they would lose their jobs if they did not

265. Id. at 614.
266. Id.
267. Id. (citations, footnotes, and internal quotations omitted).

268. 392 U.S. 273 (1968).
269. Id. at 279. Similarly, in Lejkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801 (1977), the plaintiff, Cunningham, was subpoenaed to testify before a special grand jury convened to investigate his alleged improper
conduct in the political offices he had held, which consisted of elected positions in the Democratic
Party of the State of New York. Id. at 803. Cunningham refused to testify on Fifth Amendment grounds.
Id. at 804. Under a New York statute, Cunningham's invocation of his rights under the privilege
automatically divested him of all his party offices, and activated a five-year ban on holding any public
or party office. Id. at 803. Cunningham then filed a civil suit in federal court, alleging that the New
York statute was unconstitutional because it penalized the invocation of his right to remain silent. Id. at
804. After the lower courts agreed with Cunningham, the Supreme Court affirmed. Id. The Supreme
Court stated: "[W]hen a State compels testimony by threatening to inflict potential sanctions unless the
constitutional privilege is surrendered, that testimony is obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment
and cannot be used against the declarant in a subsequent criminal prosecution." Id. at 805.
270. 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
271. Id. at 495.

272. Id.
273. The New Jersey statute in question provided:
Any person holding or who has held any elective or appointive public office, position or
employment (whether state, county or municipal), who refuses to testify upon matters relating
to the office, position or employment in any criminal proceeding wherein he is a defendant or
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testify. 274 The Court held that the imposition of this "penalty" rendered their
statements "compelled" in violation of the privilege, adding that the privilege is
a right of which the exercise "may not [be] condition[ed] on the exaction of a
price.- 27 5 The Court applied this principle again in Lefkowitz v. Turley,2 76 where
two architects who worked on occasion as independent contractors for the state
were barred from receiving future state contracts because they invoked the
privilege before a state grand jury investigating corruption in the public contracting industry.27 7 The Court viewed such government conduct as "compulsion"
because it imposed sanctions on the exercise of the right to remain silent.278
This line of cases was expressly reaffirmed as recently as 1999 in Mitchell v.
United States,27 9 when the Court held that the defendant's silence at sentencing
could not be used to justify the imposition of a "penalty" by the trial court in the
form of an increase in her sentence.28 °
Two points concerning the Court's interpretation of "compulsion" in the
formal setting are noteworthy. First, these cases make clear that the test for
compulsion is objective.2 8' In none of these cases did the Court apply a
subjective "totality of circumstances" test, such as that associated with the due
process involuntary confession rule,28 2 to determine if compulsion was present.283
There was no inquiry into the state of mind of the defendant or whether the
defendant in question actually felt compulsion. Indeed, in Garrity, the Court
is called as a witness on behalf of the prosecution, upon the ground that his answer may tend
to incriminate him or compel him to be a witness against himself or refuses to waive
immunity when called by a grand jury to testify thereon or who willfully refuses or fails to
appear before any court, commission or body of this state which has the right to inquire under
oath upon matters relating to the office, position or employment of such person or who,
having been sworn, refuses to testify or to answer any material question upon the ground that
his answer may tend to incriminate him or compel him to be a witness against himself, shall,
if holding elective or public office, position or employment, be removed therefrom or shall
thereby forfeit his office, position or employment and any vested or future right of tenure or
pension granted to him by any law of this state provided the inquiry relates to a matter which
occurred or arose within the preceding five years. Any person so forfeiting his office, position
or employment shall not thereafter be eligible for election or appointment to any public office,
position or employment in this state.
N.J. Rev. Stat. § 2A:81-17.1 (Supp. 1965), quoted in Garrity, 385 U.S. at 494 n.1.
274. Garrity, 385 U.S. at 494.
275. Id. at 500.
276. 414 U.S. 70 (1973).
277. Id. at 82-83.
278. Id.
279. 526 U.S. 314 (1999).
280. Id. at 328-30. For an additional discussion of the "formal setting" cases, see generally Steven
D. Clymer, Compelled Statements From Police Officers and Garrity Immunity, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1309
(2001); Anthony J. Phelps, Note, Applicability of the Fifth Amendment Privilege Against SelfIncriminationat Sentencing: Mitchell v. United States Settles the Conflict, 38 BRANDEIS L.J. 107 (2000);
Shannon T. Noya, Comment, Hoisted By Their Own Petard:Adverse Inferences in Civil Forfeiture, 86
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 493 (1996).
281. See Herman, Part II, supra note 39, at 503.
282. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
283. See Herman, Part 11, supra note 39, at 503.
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ignored the facts (which Justice Harlan noted in his dissent) that, at the inquiry,
"all of the officers were advised they had a right to remain silent, three of the
officers were represented by counsel, a fourth officer had decided that counsel
in familiar surroundings, and the
was not necessary, the interrogation took place
2 84
interrogation was both brief and civilized.
Second, the privilege was seen in these "formal setting" cases to prohibit the
government's imposition of "objectively identifiable penalties" in response to
silence or to provoke speech,285 regardless of the severity of the penalty. 286 By
"identifiable," I mean that in each of these cases, the penalty could be identified
and articulated from the record as an actual and concrete penalty: a comment
that increased the chance of a conviction, the loss of a job, the loss of future
state contracts, etc. By "objectively," I mean simply that it was not necessary
that the identifiable penalty was actually felt by the speaker. For example, the
loss of future state contracts in Turley was considered a penalty regardless of
whether the architects intended to seek state contracts in the future, or whether
the loss of such contracts would affect their income.2 87 The remainder of this
Article will refer to such penalties as "objectively identifiable penalties."
B. THE "OBJECTIVELY IDENTIFIABLE PENALTY TEST" SHOULD BE EXTENDED TO THE
INTERROGATION CONTEXT, AS IT IS MORE HISTORICALLY, TEXTUALLY, AND
DOCTRINALLY SOUND THAN THE ALTERNATIVE "CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION" OR
'VOLUNTARINESS" TESTS

This Article proffers that a correct interpretation of "compelled" in the
interrogation setting must be reconciled with how the Court has interpreted
"compelled" in the formal setting. The privilege against compulsory selfincrimination purports to establish a single standard. Without an adequate legal
justification, it would be strange, if not doctrinally unsound, to interpret a
certain government act to constitute "compulsion" in some scenarios, but not in
others. Under this view, police officers would be prohibited from imposing
"objectively identifiable penalties" on suspects inany setting and in any form in
response to silence or to provoke speech. This test will be developed inmore
detail inSection c.
The idea that the "formal setting" cases should be used to determine the

284. Id. (citing Garrity, 385 U.S. at 502-06 (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
285. See supra notes 259-84 and accompanying text.
286. Noted scholars Stephen J. Schulhofer and the late Joseph D. Grano debated the meaning of
these "formal setting" cases in two seminal articles: Schulhofer, supra note 50 and Joseph D. Grano,
Miranda's ConstitutionalDifficulties: A Reply to Professor Schulhofer, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 174 (1988).
Although they vehemently disagreed on the application of these cases to the police interrogation
setting, see infra notes 289-340 and accompanying text, both agreed that these cases prohibit the
imposition of any penalty, no matter how slight, in response to silence or to provoke speech. See
Schulhofer, supra note 50, at 443 (even nominal fine would violate privilege); Grano, supra, at 183
(agreeing that nominal penalty would violate privilege because it asserts a "claim of right" to the
defendant's testimony).
287. See supra notes 276-78.
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meaning of compulsion in the interrogation context is not a novel concept.
Indeed, two notable Fifth Amendment scholars, Professors Stephen Schulhofer
and Lawrence Herman, have argued variations of the same.2 88 Professor Schulhofer argues, for example, that the "formal setting" line of cases supports the
Court's holding in Miranda that custodial interrogation, by itself, equates with
compulsion in violation of the privilege.28 9 Schulhofer asserts that the improper
comments in Griffin v. California290 that the jury should consider the defendant's silence in determining guilt applied "impermissible pressure" on the
defendant to testify.2 9' Schulhofer then equates this atmospheric pressure present
in the courtroom in Griffin with the atmospheric pressure inherent in the police
station during custodial interrogation. 29 2 What Schulhofer fails to recognize,
however, is that the Griffin decision was not based upon the presence of
atmospheric pressure. Rather, the comments made by the prosecutor and the
judge were seen to violate the privilege because they constituted "objectively
identifiable penalties" against the defendant, as they directly increased the
chances of his conviction.29 3 As the Court itself recognized, atmospheric pressure was present from the beginning of Griffin's trial for him to provide his side
of the story, as it is in any criminal trial.2 94 But the penalties imposed by the
prosecutor and the judge went beyond that ordinary atmospheric pressure,
changing the status quo in favor of the government and against the defendant.295
The comments "solemnized" that pressure into an actual penalty that could be
objectively identified and measured.2 96
Contrary to Schulhofer's assertions, when a police officer simply asks a
question of a suspect in custody, that act has not, by itself, imposed an
objectively identifiable penalty in response to silence or to provoke speech. If,
during the interrogation, the officer changes the status quo to provoke a
confession by, for example, depriving the suspect of cigarettes until he talks or

288. See generally Schulhofer, supra note 50 (arguing that the "formal setting" cases require an
objective test for compulsion in the police interrogation context and that these cases also support the
holding in Miranda); Herman, Part11, supra note 39 (arguing that the "formal setting" cases suggest an
objective test for compulsion in the police interrogation context).
289. See generally Schulhofer, supra note 50.
290. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
291. See Schulhofer, supra note 50, at 453.
292. Id.
293. See supra notes 265-67 and accompanying text.
294. Griffin, 380 U.S. at 614. As anyone who has tried criminal cases can verify, significant pressure
is present in nearly every trial for the defendant to provide the jury with an explanation as to why he or
she is innocent. This inherent pressure exists throughout the trial, from opening statements through
summations. For example, when a particularly damaging piece of evidence is admitted against a
defendant during the prosecution's case-in-chief, the members of the jury almost invariably turn their
heads in unison like an audience watching a tennis match and stare at the defendant to see his or her
reaction. Is he calm? Is he squirming in his seat? Does he look ashamed or guilty? In some situations, it
is clear to any observer that the jurors are searching for an answer from the defendant-an explanation.
It is unimaginable to me that defendants would not feel this implicit demand from the jury.
295. Id.
296. Id.
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telling him that his silence will be used against him at trial, then the officer has
at that time "solemnized" the pressure into an "objectively identifiable penalty"
to provoke speech. The "formal setting" cases would require a finding
of
2 97
"penalty.
a
such
of
imposition
the
moment-at
that
at
only
compulsion
Furthermore, Schulhofer's proposal is contrary to existing law. As described
previously, the Miranda-exception cases have undermined the notion that custodial interrogation equates with compulsion. 298 The Supreme Court has not yet
provided a new definition of "compulsion," but it is clear that it requires some
amount of pressure beyond mere custodial interrogation. 299 The "objectively
identifiable penalty" test that I have proposed, therefore, is consistent not only
with the "formal setting" cases, but with the Court's current interpretation of
"compelled" in the police interrogation setting as well.
On the other hand, another notable scholar, the late Professor Joseph Grano,
asserted vigorously for years that the test for compulsion should be the same as
that under the due process involuntary confession rule: whether the confession
was made "voluntarily. '30 0 This theory should be rejected for several reasons.
First, the "voluntariness test" is contrary to the text of the privilege. The word
"voluntary" is, linguistically speaking, an adjective that calls for an inquiry into
the suspect's state of mind. The word "voluntary" therefore demands a subjective test-focusing on all factors that could affect the suspect's mental state. Not
surprisingly, the due process rule that has evolved around the word "voluntary"
likewise requires an inquiry into the "totality of the circumstances" to determine
whether the suspect's will has been "overborne. 3 0° It is a subjective test, which
takes into account not only the governmental conduct involved, but characteristics unique to the speaker, such as his age, background, the strength of his
character and his mental condition at the time.30 2 Under a subjective voluntariness test, a particularly hearty suspect may be deemed to have made a voluntary
statement in the face of enormous pressure, while a particularly weak suspect
may be deemed to have made an involuntary statement in response to the
lightest of pressures.
The text of the privilege, however, requires no such focus on the state of
mind of the individual being questioned. The privilege says nothing about
"involuntary" confessions-only "compelled" confessions. 30 3 "To compel" has
been defined as "to drive forcefully" and "to cause to do by overwhelming

297. See supra notes 259-87 and accompanying text.
298. See supra notes 73-88 and accompanying text.
299. See id.
300. See generally Grano, supra note 286 (arguing that the test for compulsion should be a
"voluntariness" inquiry); Joseph D. Grano, Selling the Idea to Tell the Truth: The Professional
Interrogator and Modem Confession Law, 84 MIcH. L. REV. 662 (1986) [hereinafter Grano, Selling the
Idea to Tell the Truth] (same).
301. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
302. See id.
303. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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pressure. 3 °4 The privilege, like the rest of the Bill of Rights, restrains the
conduct of government officials only. 30 5 Therefore, the term "compel," as used
in the privilege and in the context of its placement in the Bill of Rights, is a verb
that relates to the action of the government official performing the interrogation.
It demands an objective test, because semantically it directs the focus of the
inquiry solely on to the conduct of the government official applying the pressure
in question, rather than the subjective mental state of the suspect. If the force
used by the government official objectively rises to the level of "compulsion"
the privilege has been violated, period.
This objective interpretation of the term "compelled," which focuses solely
on police conduct, is consistent not only with the text of the privilege and how
h
306 btwt
but with the
the privilege has been defined in the "formal setting" cases,
historical origins of the privilege as well. Nothing in the scholarly literature
suggests that the Framers intended to create a sliding scale that adjusts the
amount of force permissible depending on characteristics unique to the suspect.
The historical events leading up to the inclusion of the privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination in the Bill of Rights reflect a simple desire by the
Framers to prohibit the government's use of force and other such objectively
identifiable penalties in response to silence or to provoke speech. The precursor
of these events was the operation of the Star Chamber, the Court of High
Commission and the other ecclesiastical courts of medieval and early modern
Europe, which produced confessions from subjects through the use of torture
and other objective devices of coercion.3 °7 Thus, the Framers were aware of

304. MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 234 (10th ed. 1995).
305. Cf. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443-44 (2000) (stating that the privilege and Bill
of Rights limit conduct of government officials only, not private parties).
306. See supra notes 259-87 and accompanying text.
307. See LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT: THE RIGHT AGAINST SELFINCRIMINATION 34-35, 101 (2d ed. 1986) (discussing Tudor England's Star Chamber and other ecclesiastical proceedings, and their use of physical and psychological torture, such as oaths, to obtain
confessions). For an additional discussion of the historical events that prompted the inclusion of the
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination in the Bill of Rights, see generally Albert W. Alschuler,
A Peculiar Privilege In Historical Perspective: The Right to Remain Silent, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2625
(1996) (discussing the Court of High Commission in England and its use of psychological devices such
as oaths to compel confessions); Benner, supra note 51; R.H. Helmholz, Origins of the Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination: The Role of the European lus Commune, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962 (1990)
(discussing use of ex-officio oath in continental Europe to obtain confessions in ecclesiastical inquiries); Herman, Part I, supra note 87 (discussing use of torture in Europe to compel confessions); John J.
Langbein, The HistoricalOrigins of the PrivilegeAgainst Self-Incrimination at Common Law, 92 MICH.
L. REV. 1047 (1994) (same).
Foremost among these objective devices of torture was the oath ex officio. This procedure, used by
the High Commission, Star Chamber and other ecclesiastical courts, required its subjects to take an oath
to God that they would respond truthfully to all questions put to them. See Penney, supra note 64, at
315. Failure to take the oath resulted in being held in contempt and the imposition of imprisonment or
torture. Id. Although it may be difficult to understand how an oath could constitute torture today, the
religious beliefs prevalent in this era ensured that perjury was viewed as a mortal sin. Id. Thus, a
suspect under interrogation in the Star Chamber, for example, had a choice of remaining silent and
facing physical penalties, such as torture or imprisonment, taking the oath and incriminating himself,
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interrogation devices-certain "objectively identifiable penalties"-that were
utilized by those in authority in medieval and Renaissance Europe to obtain
confessions. By including a provision in the Bill of Rights barring the government's use of compulsion to obtain statements, they undoubtedly intended to
prohibit the government's use of such penalties.3 °8
Professor Grano's "voluntariness test" proposal can be traced to the Court's
first interpretation of the privilege in Brain v. United States.30 9 Although Bram
has been explicitly repudiated by the Supreme Court, 31 ° an examination of the
decision is nonetheless revealing because it demonstrates the problematic origins of the voluntariness test. In holding the defendant's statements inadmissible under the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, the Bram Court
stated: "[A] confession, in order to be admissible, must be free and voluntary;
that is, must not be extracted by any sort of threats or violence, nor obtained by
any direct or implied promises, however slight, nor by the exertion of any
improper influence. ' ' 31' In conflating compulsion with voluntariness, the Bram
Court completely ignored the text of the privilege and the use therein of the
objective verb "compelled" rather than the subjective adjective "voluntary."
But that was only its first mistake. The Bram Court then purported to address
the historical underpinnings of the privilege.3 12 Its analysis on this point reveals
a second problem with the Court's voluntariness analysis. The Bram Court
started by correctly noting that the adoption of the privilege was the culmination
of centuries of "protest against the inquisitorial and manifestly unjust methods
31 3
of interrogating accused persons ...in the continental system[s]" of Europe.
The Court then recounted those "unjust methods," which included the torture
and "browbeat[ing]" of suspects.3 14 This history, so far, supports the adoption of
an objective test, designed to prohibit the imposition of certain "objectively
identifiable penalties."
At the next step, however, the Court's historical analysis is fundamentally
flawed. The Court turned to early cases in England and Colonial America that
stand for the proposition that statements must be "voluntary" to be admissible
as evidence.31 5 The Court borrowed from these cases the voluntariness test that
which would also result in punishment, or taking the oath and committing perjury, which was a mortal
sin. Id. The oath therefore constituted coercion because it required its suspects to face the cruel choice
between "earthly punishment and divine retribution." Id. For a detailed historical account of the use of
oaths in medieval and early modem England, see generally Helen Silving, The Oath: 1, 68 YALE L.J.
1329 (1959).
308. See Penney, supra note 64, at 319 (stating that the Framers included the privilege in the Bill of
Rights to prohibit the use of objective penalties such as "ex officio procedures or judicial torture" that
were prevalent in "Medieval and Renaissance Europe.").
309. 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
310. See, e.g., Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 285 (1991).
311. Bram, 168 U.S. at 542-43 (quoting 3 RUSSELL ON CRIMES 478 (6th ed. 1896)).

312.
313.
314.
315.

Id. at 543-51. See infra notes 318-26.
Id. at 544.
Id.
Id. at 550-61.
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it inexplicably substituted for the concept of compulsion.3 16 As several scholars
have pointed out, however, the voluntariness test found in these early cases is
historically unrelated to the privilege against self-incrimination and the practices the privilege was intended to address.3 17 Indeed, two distinct confession
doctrines evolved from the Middles Ages through the 19th Century.3 8 The first,
sometimes referred to as nemo tenetur,31 9 was concerned with the use of
oppressive government force during interrogations conducted by the Star Chamber and other inquisitorial tribunals in Europe. 320 This doctrine and the policies
behind it were the impetuses behind the inclusion of the privilege in the Bill of
Rights. 32 '

The second doctrine was simply a common law rule of evidence that, like
rules prohibiting the introduction of hearsay, was designed to prevent the
introduction of evidence likely to be unreliable.3 22 This doctrine was unconcerned with protecting civil liberties or curbing the brutal interrogation methods

316. Id. at 562-63.
317. See Benner, supra note 51, at 65-113 (describing the common law rule of evidence that barred
the use of "involuntary" statements as unreliable and describing its historically inaccurate conflation
with the privilege in Bram, which was, in contrast, based on the concept of nemo tenetur and adopted in
protest to the inquisitorial interrogation techniques used by the Star Chamber, High Commission and
other ecclesiastical courts in medieval and early modern Europe); Penney, supra note 64, at 314-31
(charting the independent developments of nemo tenetur, the precursor to privilege, and the voluntariness rule). But see Herman, Part I, supra note 87, at 109-70 (noting that early English and American
courts did not frequently recognize a relationship between the voluntariness doctrine and neno tenetur,
but arguing that the voluntariness doctrine served merely as the exclusionary function of nemo tenetur).
318. See Benner, supra note 51 at 65-113 (describing evolution of the two distinct confession
doctrines, the voluntariness doctrine, which was a common law rule of evidence, and nemo tenetur,
which was distinct and gave rise to the privilege against self-incrimination); see also Penney, supra
note 64 at 314-31 (same). But see Herman, Part I, supra note 87 at 106-70 (arguing that the
voluntariness doctrine at common law and the concept of nemo tenetur may not have been separate,
distinct doctrines, and that the voluntariness rule may have been the exclusionary function of nemo
tenetur).
319. The complete Latin maxim provided: "Nemo tenetur prodere seipsum," which means "no one
is bound to bring forth (i.e., accuse) himself." See Benner, supra note 51 at 74 n.50; see also Penney,
supra note 64 at 315.
320. See Herman, Part I, supra note 87, at 106-11, 112-14, 116-28, 129-33, 134-43, 147-65
(describing the doctrine of nemo tenetur, which was invoked to defend against the use of oaths, and
other devices of force, by the Court of High Commission, the Star Chamber and other ecclesiastical
courts to compel confessions); see also Benner, supra note 51, at 67-92 (same); Penney, supra note 64,
at 314-15 (noting that nemo teneturdeveloped as a defense to oaths).
321. See Herman, Part I, supra note 87, at 163-65 (stating that the constitutional protection against
compelled self-incrimination stemmed from nemo tenetur); see also Benner, supra note 51, at 88-93
(same); Penney, supra note 64, at 319 (same). See also R.H. HELMHOLZ ET AL., THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST
SELF-INCRIMINATION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 110-38 (1997) (discussing how Latin maxim Nemo

tenetur and Framers' desire to ban practices of High Commission and Star Chamber contributed to the
drafting of the Fifth Amendment).
322. See Herman, Part I, supra note 87, at III, 114, 128, 133-34, 143-62, 165-70 (describing the
evolution of voluntariness test that excluded confessions on the ground of unreliability); see also
Benner, supra note 51, at 92-93 (stating that concerns about voluntariness were rooted solely in the
concern for reliability); Penney, supra note 64, at 314-22 (explaining that involuntary confessions were
excluded because of unreliability).
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of tribunals like the Star Chamber.3 2 3 The majority of cases that constituted this
doctrine involved confessions that were deemed involuntary and thus unreliable
because of positive benefits, such as bribes, that had been offered to suspects to
induce self-incriminating statements.3 24 This doctrine was also frequently applied in civil cases in which witnesses had been bribed to make statements in
favor of a party to the litigation. 32 5 When drafting the Self-Incrimination
Clause, the Framers were understandably not concerned with government officials granting positive favors to suspects. Grants of positive favors are appropriately addressed by rules of evidence such as hearsay rules that are based on
reliability related policies, because a witness or suspect might utter certain
words of choice in order to receive benefits. The granting of positive benefits to
induce speech does not, however, infringe civil liberties, and thus does not rise
to the level of constitutional concern. History reveals that the Framers intended
the privilege to ban only negative inducements such as torture which do, in fact,
offend notions of civil liberties.32 6
Because the common law voluntariness rule based solely on reliability served
a purpose that was different from the purpose served by the privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination, its scope was appropriately different from the
scope of the privilege.3 27 If one is concerned with making sure that all evidence
admitted at trial is reliable, then one should be concerned with any matter that
might render testimony unreliable-from government conduct to the speaker's
subjective mental state, and from positive inducements to negative inducements.
Such a policy perspective calls for a subjective "totality of the circumstances"
approach to include all the factors that may render a statement unreliable. A
subjective voluntariness analysis is an appropriate test for this purpose. But this
323. See Penney, supra note 64, at 314-22 (noting that the voluntariness doctrine lacked the political
and social justifications of nemo tenetur); see also Benner, supra note 51 at 92-95 (stating that the
common law voluntariness doctrine was not directly aimed at deterring torture, as was nemo tenetur,
but was concerned instead with keeping any unreliable confession out of evidence). See also HELMHOLZ
ET AL., supra note 321, at 153-56 (discussing common law "Confession Rule," which was based on the
policy of keeping unreliable statements out of evidence, and noting that this rule has historically been
"confused with the privilege against self-incrimination").
324. See Penney, supra note 64 at 320-22 (summarizing cases involving "positive" inducements);
Benner, supra note 51 at 98-100 (same); Herman, Part I, supra note 87 at 156-68, 165-66 (same). See
also HELMHOLZ ET AL., supra note 321, at 154 (noting that the common law Confession Rule barred
confessions that had been made in response to "promises of favor" or "flattery of hope").
325. See supra note 324.
326. See supra notes 307-08 and accompanying text. See also HELMHOLZ ET AL., supra note 321, at
110-38 (describing aversion in American colonial period, based on the Latin maxim Nemo tenetur, to
the use of torture or oaths to compel confessions, and the Framers' incorporation of that aversion into
the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination); id. at 185 ("When the privilege was
embodied in the United States Constitution, its goal was simply to prohibit improper methods of
interrogation."). But see id. at 192 n.62 (suggesting that the Framers "probably" intended the privilege
to prohibit positive inducements, such as "promises of leniency," in addition to negative inducements).
327. See Herman, Part 1, supra note 87, at 106-11, I1-12, 114-16, 128-29, 133-34, 143-62,
165-70 (describing the broad application of the common law rule of evidence, which used a "voluntariness" test to determine the admissibility of confessions); see also Benner, supra note 51, at 92-113
(same); Penney, supra note 64, at 314-23 (same).
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test is detached from both the text and historical underpinnings of the privilege.32 8
Furthermore, Professor Grano's voluntariness proposal is particularly dubious
because the test has not worked in practice. This test has been used under the
parallel Due Process Clause since 1936,329 and its failings are what caused the
Court to search for the alternative it found in 1966 in Miranda.330 Because the
test is subjective and essentially requires a court to divine the state of mind of
the suspect at the time of the interrogation, it is difficult for courts to apply and
provides little guidance to the police. 331 Not surprisingly, the due process
involuntary confession rule has been widely criticized as "useless" in the
scholarly literature. 332 It is therefore questionable why anyone would want to
graft this rule onto the privilege. This is particularly true when such a rule
would be contrary to the text and history of the privilege,33 3 and would create
two completely different meanings for "compulsion" in the formal setting and
police interrogation setting, rendering the privilege's jurisprudence internally
334
inconsistent.
Moreover, the Court's decision in Miranda repudiated any notion that the
privilege requires a subjective "voluntariness" analysis, as Professor Grano
proposes.3 35 Indeed, Miranda corrected some of the Court's errors of the past,
as it clearly set forth an objective test for compulsion.33 6 Miranda was consistent with the formal setting cases in the sense that it set forth an objective
standard, focused solely on the pressure exerted by the government: custodial
interrogation.33 7 But Miranda was arguably inconsistent with the formal setting

328. See Benner, supra note 51 at 65, 92-101 (discussing the historically inaccurate conflation of the
common law voluntariness rule with the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination); see also
Penney, supra note 64, at 326-31 (same).
329. See supra notes 40-50 and accompanying text.
330. See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
331. See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
332. In Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104 (1985), the Supreme Court acknowledged its critics who had
called the "voluntariness" test under the Due Process Clause "useless," stating:
The voluntariness rubric has been variously condemned as 'useless,' Paulson, The Fourteenth
Amendment and the Third Degree, 6 STAN. L. REV. 411, 430 (1954); 'perplexing,' Grano,
Voluntariness, Free Will, and the Law of Confessions, 65 VA. L. REV. 859, 863 (1979); and
'legal 'double-talk," A. Beisel, CONTROL OVER ILLEGAL ENFORCEMENT OF THE CRIMINAL LAW:
ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 48 (1955). See generally Y. Kamisar, POLICE INTERROGATION AND
CONFESSIONS 1-25 (1980).
Id. at 116 n.4. Since the Court's decision in Fenton, several additional scholars have added their names
to the list of critics. See Penney, supra note 64, at 354, 361-62 (criticizing "voluntariness" test);
Schulhofer, supra note 50, at 451-53 (same). For arguments that the Court's alternative to the due
process voluntariness test-Miranda-is equally flawed, see generally the works of Paul G. Cassell,
supra note 87.
333. See supra notes 303-26 and accompanying text.
334. See supra notes 259-87 and accompanying text.
335. See supra notes 57-68 and accompanying text.
336. See supra notes 57-68 and accompanying text.
337. See supra notes 57-68 and accompanying text.
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cases as well because it required a finding of compulsion prior to the imposition
of any sort of objectively identifiable penalty. 338 In any event, the idea that
custodial interrogation equates with compulsion is no longer a viable theory
after Quarles and the other Miranda-exception cases. 33 9 The current state of the
Court's jurisprudence indicates that compulsion requires some amount of pressure beyond mere custodial interrogation.3 4 °
The objectively identifiable penalty test I have proposed in this Article is
consistent with current Supreme Court precedent because it requires something
beyond mere custodial interrogation to constitute compulsion. My proposal is
also doctrinally sound because it reconciles the definition of compulsion in the
police interrogation context with the Court's definition of that term in formal
settings. Finally, my proposal is also in harmony with both the text and history
of the privilege. Accordingly, it should be adopted to determine the admissibility of confessions in the international arena.
C. THE OPERATION OF THE "OBJECTIVELY IDENTIFIABLE PENALTY" TEST IN THE
INTERNATIONAL ARENA

Based on the above discussion, FBI agents abroad should be found to violate
the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination whenever they impose an
objectively identifiable penalty, in any form, on a non-American suspect in
response to the suspect's silence or in an attempt to make the suspect speak. The
test would be objective, and would focus solely on the conduct of the interrogating agents. A definition of an objectively identifiable penalty would have to be
developed on a case-by-case basis, as has occurred in the formal setting context.
This Article cannot purport to address the myriad of scenarios that arise on a
daily basis during interrogations abroad. Examples of an objectively identifiable
penalty could be a slap to provoke speech, a denial of sleep or food until the
suspect speaks, a threat that the suspect's silence will be used against him in
making charging decisions, a denial of cigarettes until and unless he speaks, a
threat with a gun to provoke speech, a refusal to allow the suspect to use the
bathroom until he speaks, or any of the other litany of penalties an imaginative
FBI agent could concoct.
Additionally, FBI agents must not make a verbal claim of right to a suspect's
statements. Stated another way, the agents must not suggest, directly or indirectly, that the suspect is required by law to speak. This rule is required under
the formal setting cases because claims of right imply the agent's ability to
resort to legal remedies, such as holding a suspect in contempt and imprisoning
him, if he does not comply. 34 1 In its most obvious form, this rule would prevent

338.
339.
340.
341.

See supra
See supra
See supra
See supra

notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
notes 73-88 and accompanying text.
notes 77-85 and accompanying text.
note 286 and accompanying text.
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an FBI agent from saying to a suspect: "You are required to tell us what
happened. You do not have a choice."
As the foregoing discussion suggests, the use of any objectively identifiable
penalty to punish silence or to provoke speech would violate the privilege. Such
a rule is required under the formal setting cases not because something as slight
as taking away a suspect's cigarettes to provoke his speech is, viewed in
isolation, the type of penalty the Framers desired to prohibit. Rather, such an act
makes a claim of right to the suspect's statements.3 42 Claims of right imply the
agent's ability to impose greater penalties. The use of punishment in any form
says to the suspect: "I have the power to punish. You do not have a choice but to
speak." Thus, even the slightest objectively identifiable penalty, if used to
punish silence or to provoke speech, makes a claim of right to the suspect's
statements, and constitutes an implied threat of the future imposition of additional penalties if the suspect does not cooperate. Such an act, as in the formal
setting cases, constitutes compulsion under the privilege.
The imposition of objectively identifiable penalties must be distinguished
from "denials of requests." Consider, for example, a suspect under interrogation
who requests that his friend be allowed in the interrogation room during the
interrogation. If the FBI agent grants access to the friend, there has clearly been
no penalty imposed. But, if the agent denies this request and the suspect then
confesses, has the agent imposed an objectively identifiable penalty? A distinction should be made as to whether the request was linked to the suspect's
continued willingness to speak. Take, for example, a suspect who says, "I will
not talk to you anymore unless my friend is present." This statement reflects an
invocation of the right to remain silent unless a condition is met. If the condition
is not met, the statement should be viewed as an unequivocal invocation of the
privilege. Thus, if the FBI agent refused to allow the suspect's friend to be
present, the agent would be required to refrain from any further questioning,
just as would occur in the formal setting when someone invoked the right to
remain silent. If the FBI agent then stated, "We're not going to allow your
friend to sit in, so I guess this interview is finished," the interrogation could
continue only if the suspect initiated further dialogue.
But what about a request that is not tied to an invocation of the privilege?
Suppose an in-custody suspect under interrogation simply asks, "Can I have
some food?" Whether a denial of this request would constitute an impermissible
penalty turns on two factors. The first factor is whether the denial would

342. See supra note 286 (discussing how claims of right violate the privilege). Professor Grano
argues that mere custodial interrogation does not constitute compulsion because it does not assert a
"claim of right" to the suspect's statements. See Grano, Selling the Idea to Tell the Truth, supra note
300, at 684. 1 agree with this point. Grano's argument implicitly admits, however, that police actions
that do in fact make a claim of right constitute compulsion. His argument in favor of a voluntariness
test for compulsion contradicts this admission, because many objectively identifiable penalties would
implicitly make a claim of right to a suspect's statements, but would not render the statements
involuntary. Professor Grano's article does not attempt to explain this contradiction.
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negatively change the status quo from the suspect's normal conditions of
custody. For example, if the suspect is normally allowed to eat at that time
under the conditions of his custody, not allowing him to eat would constitute a
penalty above and beyond the status quo. But if the suspect made a ridiculous
request that went above and beyond the status quo, like a request to have his
favorite meal flown in, the denial of this request could not be seen as changing
the status quo or imposing a penalty to provoke speech.34 3 Second, the denial
would have to be objectively viewed as designed to punish silence or provoke
speech. This determination would depend on the unique circumstances of the
interrogation. If the request was made while the suspect was talking freely, the
denial of such a request should not give rise to an inference that it was designed
to punish speech or provoke silence. But if, for example, the request and denial
occurred after hours of contentious dialogue, and at a point when the suspect
was at his "breaking point," a contrary inference might be drawn. 3 4
CONCLUSION

American courts have not yet determined which constitutional confession
doctrines, if any, protect non-Americans beyond the borders of the United
States. But as American crime continues to become more global in nature, such
determinations will have to be made in the not too distant future. In the United
States, a two-step test controls the admissibility of confessions. The first step,

343. If the suspect were not in custody, the conditions and status quo would be determined by the
setting of the interrogation. Indeed, if the interrogation were taking place in the suspect's home, the FBI
would not be able to deny a request for food, because to do so would constitute an impermissible
"claim of right" if the second factor, discussed in the text above, also was present. See supra notes 286,
342 and accompanying text (discussing claims of right).
344. The test that I have proposed in this Article is different than the due process involuntary
confession rule in two respects. First, the objectively identifiable penalty test is objective and looks
solely at the police conduct involved, while the due process rule is subjective and examines the "totality
of the circumstances." See supra note 44 and accompanying text. Second, the test proposed herein for
compulsion is more protective of a suspect's rights than the due process involuntary confession rule.
The due process rule requires suppression only when the suspect's will has been overborne. Id. The
compulsion test proposed in this Article requires suppression whenever an objectively identifiable
penalty has been imposed in response to silence or to provoke speech, regardless of the state of the
suspect's will. Indeed, many such penalties would not cause the suspect's will to be overborne. One
may therefore ask the following questions: "If the test under the privilege is more protective of a
suspect's rights, shouldn't that test apply in all cases-even within the United States? By allowing
confessions to be introduced that were obtained through the imposition of penalties that did not
overbear the suspect's will, isn't the Court allowing the privilege against self-incrimination to be
violated?" I would answer both of those questions in the affirmative. Simply put, by refusing to define
compulsion under the privilege, the Court has allowed itself to use the less-restrictive due process
standard without, at least on the surface, appearing to be doctrinally inconsistent. See Herman, Part II,
supra note 39, at 518-28 (stating that any definition of "compulsion" would have to be broader than the
due process "voluntariness test," and that the Court has avoided defining compulsion because it prefers
the less-restrictive standard under the Due Process Clause). The Court has perhaps avoided providing a
clear definition for compulsion because such a definition would have to be squared with the formal
setting cases, which define that term broadly. By avoiding the issue, the Court can continue using the
less-restrictive due process involuntary confession rule that it prefers.
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the Miranda doctrine, is inapplicable in the international arena. The second
step, the due process involuntary confession rule, likewise offers nonAmericans no protection abroad. However, non-Americans abroad are in fact
protected by the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, and its prohibition on "compelled" confessions when questioned by American agents.
Due to judicial politics and compromises, the Supreme Court has not clearly
defined compulsion in the interrogation context. Indeed, it has not needed to, as
the due process involuntary confession rule has served as Miranda's back-up
test, and has accordingly shielded the privilege from direct judicial scrutiny.
Because the due process involuntary confession rule is inapplicable in this
context, however, American courts will finally be forced to determine the
meaning of a "compelled" confession.
This Article contends that the privilege requires an objectively identifiable
penalty test. This test prohibits law enforcement officers from imposing objectively identifiable penalties on suspects in response to silence, or to provoke
speech. This test is consistent with both the text and historical underpinnings of
the privilege. It is also in harmony with the Court's interpretations of the
privilege in the formal setting, such as trials, and with the Court's incomplete
definition of compulsion in the police interrogation setting. Accordingly, the
objectively identifiable penalty test should be adopted by American courts to
determine the admissibility of confessions made by non-Americans to FBI
agents abroad.
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